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The present work aggregates some theoretical knowledge concerning capital 
structure aiming to provide a holistic view over the topic, with the objective of 
reinforce the idea and importance of liquidity as part of the Capital Structure 
definition.  
The study was made over data representative of the European and American firms 
(patent in STOXX600 and S&P500 indexes respectively) over the period of 2001 to 2016.  
The paper follows a methodology similar to the one found in Frank & Goyal (2009), 
using the several regressions and creating models by selecting the factors  that are 
found to consistently being part of the minimum bayesian information criterion and 
appear with coefficients statistically significant. The selection of “the most important 
variables” were made for measures of leverage, liquidity and net leverage. It is also 
studied the approach of the theoretical models and how thy explain the results by 
matching expectations created in the first with the coefficients signals found. The 
theoretical models approached, as in literature review is described are the “trade-off”, 
“pecking order”, “agency” or “free cash flow theory”, “managerial optimism” and 
“market timing”. 
The principal conclusions are that for leverage the “most reliable” variables are 
growth (with a negative relation (-)), dividends (-), size (+), industry median leverage 
(+), cash holding’s average (-), free cash flow (-) and working capital (-). Mainly the 
significance of industry median leverage and cash holding’s average (define two 
targets leverage and liquidity) are the most important evidence of the tradeoff theory 
expectations. For liquidity the best variables found were the nature of assets (-), 
industry median cash holdings (+), cash holdings average (+), working capital (-), 
stock issuances (+), spread rate (+). In the two models is reflected predominance of the 
tradeoff theory for explanation of the relations, (even though there are some variables 
that it is not observable). The model of net leverage appears to be explained better by 
industry median leverage (+), cash holding’s average (-), free cash flow (-) and working 
capital (-), stock repurchases (+), overinvestment (-) and risk (-). From those it was 
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found that the model incorporates the common variables of liquidity and leverage 
(cash holdings average and working capital). It was found consistently that leverage 
and debt have negative relation, not only for the coefficients found in incorporating 
liquidity as independent variable, but also comparing the coefficients behavior of the 
same factors when explaining at the same time leverage, liquidity and net leverage.  
This paper presents a theoretical suggestion that the pecking order and tradeoff 
theory are not independent theories, but they complement each other, and the results 
provided, even insufficient, are consistent with that, as it is indicated, the targets for 
optimal decisions explained by the tradeoff and some significant variables which the 
relations with the dependent variables are better explained by the pecking order. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
What is the capital structure? What influences the financing decisions? And 
how? The present study aims to contribute for the recognition of the concept of 
capital structure and the inclusion of the most basic source of financing: “Cash”.  
A lot of literature concerning this subject defines the capital structure as the 
portion of debt on the value of the firm. Without wanting to lead to an erroneous 
conclusion that this is wrong, the concept defined as that is just too simple for the 
complexity of the subject. This paper infers a relation between the definition of 
liquidity and the “classical approach definition” of the capital structure that is 
aimed to understand as significant in the conclusion.  
To my knowledge, a study connecting leverage and cash holdings was never 
approached in this way despite the lot of literature existing on the matter, so this 
study aims to contribute in that way for the recognition of the importance of 
approach the capital structure theory as a very dynamic and complex topic and 
avoid narrowing it as just a debt to firm value ratio.  
The empirical study is made on data concerning the most representative and 
diversified benchmarks of firms from America and Europe in order to also get a 
diversified sample that form firms in different contexts. The studied period 
approached aims to include both after and before subprime and sovereign debt 
crisis and starting in the post “dot com” crisis. 
The objectives of the study are the matching of some theoretical theories with 
the observed reality, the definition of the best factors that influence this topic and 
obtain patterns that show the importance of the relation between liquidity and 
leverage. The structure of the work will follow the description and order of the 
following paragraphs. 
In the “Literature Review” are approached the most relevant and theories 
concerning to this study that serve as a guideline for the interpretation of the 
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results. The approached theories are the “trade-off”, “pecking order”, “agency” 
or “free cash flow theory”, “managerial optimism” and “market timing”. All of 
them provide groundings to infer causes and consequences of financing 
decisions. By looking at the relations observed in the results from all variables it 
will be possible to attest the application of those theories contexts and/or 
predominance. There is space for the argumentation of the paper where it is 
suggested a complementarity of theories.  
 The “ Data and Methodology” describes the procedures used, that by 
following Frank & Goyal (2009), are based on the usage of the minimum bayesian 
criterion to infer the best models for each dependent variable. As the procedure 
involves a lot of tests (ordinary least square regressions) the results obtained by 
observing reported consistent signals of coefficients will provide the ground to 
infer the appliance of the theoretical models to the empirical work. After getting 
the "best variables" it is made a comparison between models for leverage, cash 
holdings, leverage with cash holdings as independent variable and finally net 
leverage. This in order to find patterns that indicate, as already stated, relations 
of liquidity and leverage as well getting most robust interpretation of the 
relations between factors and dependent variables connecting to the theoretical 
predictions.   
The “Results” will describe the outcomes of the procedures described in 
methodology, starting by an overview of the descriptive statistics, followed by 
results of the correlations and univariate tests.  Then the factor selection model 
(the appliance of the methodology similar to the found in Frank & Goyal (2009) 
results are described first in an analysis of the results found in all the contexts 
that the methodology were applied, followed by the signals consistency results 
show in the process (ground for concluding the relations between dependent and 
independent variables). After that, are described the factors that were chosen by 
the criterions applied (related with the observations of significant coefficients 
and inclusion on minimum bayesian criterion models). Finally, there are 
described the resulted models and the relations results and compared the models 
and variables achieved and introducing liquidity as independent variables.  
 In “Conclusions” are interpreted the results obtained and matched with 
the theoretical predictions and the suggestion made. There is also described some 






Capital structure is a topic profoundly studied over the last years all over the 
world. Despite of all attempts of explaining all, or at least the best determinants 
concerns the financing decisions of the organizations, this topic is still a puzzle 
with three pieces of financing sources with no absolutive rationale to fit them. 
Hence during the years, many investigators have developed some theories and 
approaches in order to solve the problem: “How do firms choose their capital 
structures?” (Myers, 1984). Since the companies are managed in order to 
maximize its own best interest, the capital sources have an implied cost that 
should be managed in order benefit the value of the company (Durand, 1952). 
This last article presents a thought on the importance of measuring the costs 
incurred in financing decisions, being one of the most important departing points 
of the capital structure theory considering its importance in explaining the value 
of a company. The debate relating the leverage proportions influencers provides 
discussion based on a more behavioristic logic and/or more mathematical 
models.  
The theories approached in general define the capital structure as the 
proportion of leverage (debt) on a company’s value, reflecting the relation 
between the different financing sources: internal equity, debt and external equity. 
In this paper the focus will be more on the enlightening of the importance of the 
internal equity articulating with the remaining sources of financing.  
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2.2. The Evolution of Capital Structure Theory 
2.2.1. The Classical Approach 
The classical approach gives the perspective that the maximization of the 
value of the company is achieved when the cost of capital is minimized. This 
rationale is very well explained in the already mentioned article of Durand 
(1952). This is not as simple to implement as it looks like. This article alerts for 
the importance of the methods of measure value at the time, and as mentioned, 
alerts for the opportunity costs of using the profits in form of cash or retained 
earnings which constitute an implicit cost and are sources of agency problems 
between stakeholders as it will be seen forward1. So, to the puzzle of the equity 
and debt, and liquidity of the company carries a cost that should be managed in 
order to get the minimization of those opportunity costs.  
In what concerns the subject of “cash management”, Durand clearly identifies 
the implicit cost of the use of retained earnings as the opportunity cost when 
financing new investments to the detriment of paying dividends and vice-versa. 
The money earned by company in its operations must be used in paying its dues 
that are legally obliged and its management must be made in order to avoid the 
higher opportunity costs in transactions. 
2.2.2. Modelling for Perfect Markets 
Modigliani & Miller (1958) theorized some of the most important foundations 
on the capital structure theory with a model that values the combined costs of 
capital of debt and equity in a world determined by strict set of market conditions 
to be considered as a perfect market2. They showed mathematically that under 
those conditions “(…) the market value of any firm is independent of its capital 
structure (…)”, suggesting that the value creation of the firms is provided by the 
                                               
1 See agency theory 
2 The assumptions made that founded this theory are the absence of tax, no bankruptcy nor 
transaction costs, allowance only for the firms to issue risk free debt and stock, the risk is. 
equivalent for all firms, no asymmetry of information concerning outside investors and the 
managers have the goal to maximize shareholder’s wealth. 
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revenues and the cost of capital. This was a controversial argument since it 
showed an irrelevance of financing decisions in order to obtain gains though 
them and consequently a pursue of increasing the value of the firm. 
This theory served for the purpose of provide a simplification for a better 
understanding of the capital structure problem. The irrelevance of the capital 
structure motivated a lot of research in order to prove the relevance of the capital 
structure and the failure of Modigliani-Miller theorem by relaxing some 
conditions and proposing new determinants to become more realistic.  
2.2.3. Tradeoff Model 
The “tax effect” was reviewed by Modigliani & Miller in 1963 and captures 
one of the fundamental determinants of the financing theory. This determinant 
captures the great advantage of financing by issuing debt through the tax 
deductions of interest payments also known as “tax shields” (which lower the 
cost of debt capital). This predicted that the best option of capital structure was 
100% weight of debt since it didn’t present an offset of the advantage of debt. 
This was concerned in the foundation of the “tradeoff model” that contrasts the 
advantages of debt with the disadvantages of bankruptcy costs. Hirshleifer 
(1966) suggested the importance of corporate and personal taxes as well as 
bankruptcy costs. Of the last, Baxter (1967) presented some empirical evidence 
on its existence both directly or indirectly. Kraus & Litzenberger (1973) created a 
model that demonstrates that “the market value of a levered firm is shown to 
equal the unlevered market value, plus the corporate tax rate times the market 
value of the firm's debt, less the complement of the corporate tax rate times the 
present value of bankruptcy costs”. So, the “tradeoff theory” consists on the 
decision of capital structure based on an equilibrium between the advantage of 
tax-shields and the disadvantages of bankruptcy costs provided by excessive 
leverage. In a “static” point of view, a firm should optimize its value throughout 
this equilibrium. The discussion on the tax policy is not restricted to the corporate 
tax shields as investors face personal taxes from capital gains and that should be 
considered since it may offset the tax-shields advantage. This may influence in 
the dividend policy affecting the capital structure by stimulating the retained 
earnings (Miller, 1977). 
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Myers (1984) enlighten another point of view of the “tradeoff theory” that 
considers a “target” debt-equity ratio that firms attempt to follow. The argument 
is that due to adjusting costs there are some “lags” from events that change the 
distance from the optimum leverage ratio and delay the adjustment of the 
company to that target. This leads to a necessity of analysis of the behavior of the 
leverage through the time leading to the “dynamic models” in order to find if 
firms adjust gradually to the target. Fischer, Heinkel, & Zechner (1989) 
introduced a key point to the dynamic trade-off model that relates to the topic 
discussed in this paper, that are the transaction costs. They showed also that 
volatility is negatively related with leverage.  
2.2.4. Pecking Order Theory 
Other main theory that aims to explain the reasons behind the financing 
decisions is the “pecking order theory” well defined by Myers (1984) that consist 
in a financing decision made by order of preference. An observation of 
Donaldson (1961) quotes that firms prefer using the generating funds. Internal 
equity is by this theory the first option (which comprehends the management of 
the existing retained earnings in form of cash or equivalents). By this theory, the 
excess cash3 is managed in order to allow the firm to meet the investment needs 
in cases where the operational cash is insufficient. For that reason, and following 
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999) when the current operational cash 
flows are insufficient, the firm uses the excess cash in form of cash holdings, 
while otherwise they tend to accumulate and/or distribute them as dividends. 
When exhausted the business and excess cash of the firm, the firms, by this theory 
consider the external financing as a hypothesis with the issuance of new debt and 
then new external equity (in cases where the firm reached the full debt financing 
capacity).  
 This observed behavior is suggested to be caused by asymmetry of 
information between the managers, debtholders and stockholders. The 
asymmetries of information are sources of what are considered to be behavioral 
approaches that are the fundamentals of this theory. This means that the 
                                               
3 Excess cash is typically defined as cash and marketable securities above that used in the 
normal course of the business (Lins, Servaes, & Tufano, 2010) 
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understanding the pecking order is intrinsically connected to the interpretation 
of the adverse selection problem. 
The “adverse selection” point of view exploit the dynamics of perception of 
value between the firm (manager) and the investor. The famous “Market for 
Lemons” work (Akerlof, 1979) addresses this question and presents the problem 
of the different sides in a negotiation have different knowledge about the object 
(more precisely, the seller knows more about the value of the object than the 
possible buyer). For corporate financial structure purpose, in this case “the seller 
is not offering a single good, but a partial claim on two, the asset-in-place and the 
new project” (Myers & Majluf, 1984). This supports some pertinent reasonings 
about the investor’s reactions to the financing decisions.  
It is assumed that all the players tend to make decisions in their own benefit. 
Myers & Majluf (1984) address this question for the assumption of perfect 
markets, starting by making an analysis of three stages of values information4. 
With that is shown that the manager always has the real value of an investment 
before the market, implying that the market in the stage of asymmetric 
information only have access to estimates based on the distribution of asset’s 
possible values (for the firm and project), thus perception of investors about 
managers activity and information released to the market will play an important 
role in financing activities. The mentioned paper shows that rationally managers 
may drop investment opportunities with “positive net present values” if, by the 
need of raising capital, the realized values of the scenarios available plunge the 
value of the old shareholders. And as the real values information reaches the 
manager firstly, the decision of issuing may induce the perception of real scenario 
to the market as it may be confronted which scenario is more beneficial and to 
whom.  
Other perspective of this, is that investors perceive the “news conveyed by an 
issue [as] bad or at least less good” interfering the issue invest decision and 
ultimately the realization of a project, since the price paid by investors may be 
insufficient for that. This is due to the investor’s awareness of their ignorance, 
setting the valuation on an average basis of the future prospects benefiting bad 
projects and punishing the good ones.  
                                               
4 The first stage is where the manager and the market share the same information, the second 
is when the manager obtains information (concerning values of the firm and investment 
opportunities) and create an asymmetry with the market, and the last one is the release of the 
information on the market. 
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For the same assumptions, the existence of financial slack 5  to cover an 
investment opportunity allows the hypotheses that the return would be all 
distributed to old shareholders increasing the payoff of the scenario where the 
issue of new stocks would jeopardize their interest. The discussion of the 
importance of cash & equivalents is brought by this matter, since when it exists 
there it mitigates the probability of having to pass up a good investment 
opportunity. The conflicts between new and old shareholders are diminished, 
assuming that the old shareholders are passive and do not rebalance their 
personal portfolio. Other benefit of financial slack is the unrevealing to 
competitor about the true value of assets since the market can’t infer the 
information that managers have when they issue new stock, because they won’t 
drop the investment in any state.  
On the other side, the market fluctuates from over to undervaluing in which 
the advantage taking by managers may be compromised in the existence of the 
financial slack. In its existence, the issuing of new external new external equity is 
perceived by the market as an exploitation of over market value if it’s also 
perceived that the firm doesn’t have to issue because it has its own funds, 
constituting an adverse selection problem.  
For the debt issue, as it is riskless than equity and thus also costless, the 
required rate of return of the investment opportunity may be lower in order to 
be approved, preventing the problem of the dropped value creations at least 
partially. This possibility of financing by debt issue, as discussed by Myers & 
Majluf (1984), will be preferred in order to reduce the share of returns of new 
projects with new shareholders maximizing the investing benefits to old 
shareholders. This concludes that by an issue of new external equity to be 
perceived as a bad opportunity since it has less gains to new shareholders, 
showing that in the equilibrium, an issue of new external equity only is plausible 
for the company if the gains are negative, which repels the investors. The 
conclusion of this is the main theory of pecking order that the company will issue 
new external equity if there is no more capacity to get debt financing. This theory 
applies if the risk plays no role in financing decisions. Even though, they also 
infer that by the asymmetry of information, is also possible to explain a new 
external equity issue if the market overvalues the future variance rate.  
                                               
5 Financial slack is defined in this paper to be the “sum of cash on hand and marketable 
securities” considering ahead the unused borrowing power.  
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The dominance of debt due to asymmetric information is questioned by this 
argument and explored by some researchers as Halov & Heider (2011) showing 
empirically “that  firms avoid issuing debt when the outside market is likely to 
know little about their risk”. The risk is a crucial variable in order to understand 
the dynamics of the financing in this context since it may be perceived by the 
market as a possibility to obtain higher gains, but for the knowledge of the 
manager, it infers a higher probability of default either. This argument leads to 
the mispricing of debt which may lead to higher costs due to lack of information 
of potential debtholders. “It is likely that creditors and suppliers for these firms 
will be ‘on alert’ and will threaten to withhold future supplies, or only provide 
them at a very high cost, if there is any indication that the firm cannot meet its 
fixed obligations” (Graham, 1996). This means that the most probable a default 
is perceived, the higher will be the interest demanded by debtholders which 
constitutes a form of bankruptcy cost. Halov & Heider (2011) also show that the 
rating of firms diminishes this gap of information between management and 
market since rated firms tent to have less reluctance to search for debt financing 
than those who don’t. As the assessment of assets value, now we also consider 
the risk as source of adverse selection problems.  
It is important to mention that this theory, and the existence of information 
asymmetries has a direct impact on agency conflicts, as the asymmetries referred 
are described to be between the manager and the asset claimants (shareholders 
and debtholders). The awareness that the manager has primordially information 
about the firm than the investors may induce the manager in order to take 
advantage of those asymmetries for his benefit instead of the principal. This 
means that the information asymmetries between manager and principal are the 
foundation of the agency conflicts. 
2.2.5. Agency Theory 
From the definition given by Jensen & Meckling (1976) of an agency relation 
relies on a separation of ownership and control where the owner (principal) 
delegates the manager (agent) the power to make decisions about the 
organizational activities. Considering that they are both “utility maximizers”, the 
agency problem comes from conflicts of interests that motivate the agent to act 
on his behalf and neglect the principal’s interests. Corporate governance policies 
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arise to be needed in order to avoid the costs resulted by this problem. Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) consider the agency costs as a function of monitoring costs plus 
bonding costs plus the residual costs. The monitoring costs became from 
expenditures made by the principal in order to be aware of the managers 
activities. The bonding costs rely on the effort of the manager to show or 
guarantee the principal that acts on his behalf. The residual loss is the cost 
incurred when the actions of the manager diverge from the principal. The quoted 
paper analyzes the agency costs of equity and debt. The first one is analyzed by 
a comparison of a status of manager totally owner to a stage of declining 
ownership, and they argue that a decreasing in the equity and thus claim 
fractions on the firm’s outcomes will tempt the manager to “appropriate 
perquisites out of the firm’s resources for his own consumption” in order to offset 
some personal wealth costs (pecuniary or not). They suggest that there is a more 
important effect on the lowering of ownership fraction that is the lowering of 
effort on management activities “such as searching out new profitable ventures” 
because of personal costs leading to opportunity costs with consequence on the 
value of the firm. They also show (under a set of conditions) that the consumption 
of the resources of the firm perceived by the market will tend to lower the price 
that a new investor is willing to pay for a fraction of ownership. The monitoring 
and bonding activities have the objective to prevent this consumption, but they 
also carry a cost that will be reflected in the share price, concluding in permanent 
reduction (with or without these activities) of the value comparing to what it 
could be if the decisions were made always in the best interest of the 
organization. The magnitude of these costs is dependent, as suggested, to costs 
related with measurement the management performance, executive 
compensation and enforcement of “behavioral rules and policies”.  
The same paper illustrates the agency costs related to debt financing starting 
by arguing that creditors wouldn’t lend excessively since it would incentivize the 
manager-owner to enter in projects with higher possible gains but lower 
probability of success. The logic is that if the manager-owner has a small portion 
of claims on the assets (assuming that he is the only owner), he is tempted on 
taking that risky project because the costs would be higher in case of investment 
failure for the creditors than for him, of the returns in case of success. When 
facing the option between two investment opportunities, where the difference is 
the variance of the project, the manager-owner will choose a higher variance 
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since the equity value tends to increase. By using the Black-Scholes model (Black 
& Scholes, 1973), the decision on taking the risky project will have, relating to the 
assets value, a smaller portion of debt claims than if the safer one was token. The 
bond investors perceiving the existence of the risky project, will only buy the 
bonds issued at the price valued as if the manager would take that project. Facing 
the two scenarios, the difference of debt value for each project would be the 
amount that the manager-owner would get by misleading the bondholders about 
the risk of the investment opportunity. The agency cost would be observable in 
the difference between the value of the firm after taking the safer project against 
after deciding in favor of the riskier one (assuming that the distribution of the 
cash flows has a higher expected value in the project with less risk). At this point 
was described the agency costs related with the impact of debt in investment 
decisions, but they also show that debt is related with two other sources of 
agency costs: monitoring/bonding costs and bankruptcy costs.  The first pair 
relates to the enforcement of legal procedures in contract in order to monitor the 
agent performance that will create a cost (example: the cost of.an audit), knowing 
that the cost will be bared mostly by de manager, if he finds a way to provide the 
information less costly, he will do it in order to maximize the wealth value of the 
manager (bonding costs). The last source of agency conflicts, the bankruptcy 
costs, defined by the lack of possibility to satisfy all the debt claims (and none 
equity claims at that stage). Those are costs that are not only observed directly 
when it occurs (when the process consumes part of the claims), but also indirectly 
when there is a high probability of bankruptcy that will be reflected before in 
operating costs, manager’s demand for compensation or the costs of external 
financing for example. 
The agency theory on debt provides the conclusion that the higher amount of 
debt has consequence on decreasing the managerial discretion for the increasing 
control that the debtholders requires to fund an investment. This motives 
behaviors of managerial entrenchment defined by the failure of managers in be 
disciplined with the governance and control mechanisms such as board 
monitoring, compensation policies as defined by Berger, Ofek, & Yermack (1997). 
This paper finds evidence consistent with the entrenchment motive to lower 
leverage ratios, as the it tends to be lower in cases where the manager has more 
ownership on the firm, weaker compensation policy or weaker monitoring faced. 
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Some evidence may support the view that leverage as an instrument to avoid 
takeovers. 
1.2.5.1. Free Cash Flow Theory 
In what comes to internal financing, Jensen (1986) illustrates that the agency 
problems rely on the power that cash confer to the manager that may end in 
losing value for other shareholders. As it was already shown here, the manager 
behavior aims to maximize his benefits. This concerns a lot to the company’s 
supply of cash and its capacity to generate positive free cash flows because the 
higher these variables are, the probability for the manager to incur in losing value 
activities will also increase. And as said before, the manager may end in wasting 
resources in organization inefficiencies, investment below the cost of the capital6 
or personal consumptions. Therefore, in the presence of excess cash, the outside 
investors prefer to have it distributed as dividends or debt issue instead of 
wasting in the quoted activities. The normal course of firm activities, product 
competition, factor market, and compensation policies attached to firm 
performance are incentives for the manager to reach higher growth and/or 
higher positive free cash flows. It must be enlightened that the positive free cash 
flow is crucial for the value of the firm, even so, the higher its proportions are, 
the more careful with the agency conflicts the parties should be aware of. In cases 
of high free cash flow, the manager can pay (or increase) dividends or repurchase 
stock. The last one has two benefits for the manager: the distribution of the excess 
cash and the increasing control of future cash flows. There the promise of the 
dividends pay will matter in the value of the firm as in the quoted paper state 
that in previous works of the author it was recognized that surprising increments 
in dividends increase the value, but negative growth in dividends has a larger 
punishment. This is due to the lack of guarantees of the shareholders have that 
they will receive the payment promised, as in fact, the manager may promise that 
in the first time and discontinue the dividend payment in the next decision. 
Consequently, the debt issuance has conferred the possibility of replacing 
dividend payment as this confers to the outside investors the right of receiving 
part of cash flows in form of rent the plus of being legally bonded which forbids 
the manager to have contradictory decisions about the payments. 
                                               




2.2.6. Managerial Optimism 
In the sequence of the adverse selection and the agency theory we can extract 
for different assumptions some pros and cons of the existence of free cash flow 
in the managers hands. Heaton (2002) brings a model with a behavioral approach 
that aims to explain the two opposite main conclusions. The premise is based on 
the human tendency of being optimist in contexts of large control and/or high 
commitment to the objectives.  The definition of an optimistic manager is given 
as the context where the manager “systematically overestimate the probability of 
good firm performance and underestimate the probability of bad firm 
performance”. The rationale behind this theory is based on a tradeoff of 
underinvestment-overinvestment, or simplifying, the benefit of free cash flow 
concluded by the asymmetric information and the harm concluded by the agency 
costs, even though by different reasons.  
For the benefit of free cash flow, the theory predicts that an optimistic manager 
may assume that the market undervalues the firm’s risky security. The 
consequence is that when depending on external sources of financing, value 
creating projects may be declined by excessive financing costs making the 
internal sources of financing valuable for the manager as it allows a low-cost 
investment in a profitable project.   
On the other side, the optimism leads to the manager overvalue in such way 
that a negative net present value is perceived as positive. In these cases, the 
dependence from outside funding would block the investment, but in the 
presence of sufficient hoards of funds at his dispose, the manager may pursue 
that kind of investments. For that reason, the free cash flow could be value 
destroyer, which by being due to estimating errors, this may occur even when 
managers think they are acting in shareholders favor. 
The tradeoff is quoted in the paper to be seen in the connection of two 
variables: the optimism level and the opportunities available. The theory predicts 
that the more optimistic the manager is, more difficult is the external financing 
for the projects. In the presence of good projects, the underinvestment due to 
those barriers leads the shareholders to face high costs of opportunity. So, in 
these cases, the shareholder would prefer the retention of the cash flow and its 
risk management. In the presence of poor opportunities, the external financing 
dependence is beneficial to block the over investment. The shareholder would 
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rather prefer to see the cash flows distributed than see an accumulation in cash 
holdings.  
2.2.7. Market Timing 
At this point it was shown some of the prominent theories of capital structure 
as are the “tradeoff theory”, “pecking order” and “agency theory”. Through 
them we are able to understand some dynamics and the characteristics of each 
financing source and how they affect financing decisions. Other perspective 
became recently significant in explaining the decision making of the capital 
structure more pointed to the valuation of the market perception of the firm. This 
theory is called “market timing”, and consists on the “practice of issuing shares 
at high prices and repurchasing at low prices” with “the intention (…) to exploit 
temporary fluctuations in the cost of equity relative to other forms of capital” 
(Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Basically, the firms intend to obtain gains through the 
financial markets by taking advantage of situations where the market under and 
overvalues the firm. Many authors refer to Lucas & Mcdonald (1990) as one of 
the most influential papers in the development of this theory. They created a 
model that articulated with some adverse selection reached some pertinent 
conclusion over the timing of issuances of new external equity. They argue that 
the issuance is made when firms equity market price is a stage of overvaluing, in 
order to avoid depreciation of prices that may end in the loss of the project. In 
case of undervalued firms, they wait until the correction of market value until 
they become in the better stage to issue. The adverse selection helps to explain 
that issuance announcement is proceeded by a drop on stock prices, since the 
investors know the conditions described for a decision of issuing. The model 
evolved in Korajczyk, Lucas, & McDonald (1992) allowing the existence adverse 
selection in a continuous mode. This allowed to understand that the adverse 
selection problem increases between information disclosures given that the price 
after announcement effect drops until a new information release. Even though 
the model doesn´t account for financial slack, they argue that in case of its 
existence, undervalued firms may use it in order to accelerate the project 
financing avoiding the wait of correction in stock prices. They point also that the 
issuing new external equity for holding slack is inefficient since the cost of capital 
will represent a loss since there will be stationary money or even marketable 
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securities that may have tax disadvantages. Baker & Wurgler (2002) tested the 
theory founding evidence that the managers behave like they can time the 
market, suggesting the definition of capital structure as the cumulative outcome 
of past attempts to time the equity market. This means that there is success in the 
attempt of the managers to time the market since the suggestion of Graham & 
Harvey (2003) in their surveys showing the managers willing on doing that. It 
was found that in the existence of high cash holdings, the timing is for different 
reasons than expected. Following Bolton, Chen, & Wang (2013), when the stock 
market improves, it was unexpectable that the firm would tend to enter in 
repurchases of stock instead of issuing, but for these firms, the increasing value 
of stock is a positive signal that allows for dismiss amounts of cash held in order 
to mitigate risks. 
Even though the market timing theory was described to be done with equity 
securities and their market price movements to obtain financial gains, the same 
happens with debt securities. Faulkender (2005) found evidence that firms 
behavior changes due to market conditions of debt. The yield spread and curve 
was found to be major determinants when the managers consider an issue of debt 
with a floating or fixed rate. This means that the managers may intend to manage 
the interest rate exposure in order to get advantage from market conditions for 
obtaining a reduction on external capital financing at the lowest cost. The paper 
distinguishes two sources of interest rate risk: the assets sensitivity and debt 
securities. In a perspective of risk management, the objective of the firm would 
be a matching of both in what concerns the interest rate movements exposure, 
and so the debt issuance would follow the criterion of floating rates in case of a 
positive correlation between cash flow and interest rates and a fixed rate 
otherwise. A different behavior than that suggest a management for other 
purposes than hedging such as obtaining gains from the market conditions.  The 
empirical study reveals that the yield spread is a key determinant as the yield 
curve provide the market expectations about future economic performances 
(even expected crisis) being a reliable source for managers to make decisions 
based on timing the evolution of interest rates.  
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2.3. Internal Equity 
As stated before, Lewellen & Lewellen (2006) identify the existence of three 
sources of financing arguing the incompleteness of trade-off theory for 
undistinguishing the internal from the external equity. They both differ on the 
claims on assets being previous and post stock issuance respectively. So, the 
internal equity is constituted by the asset claims already in actual shareholders 
possession relying the retained earnings previously to a new external equity 
constitution.  
The relevance of company’s internal equity is broadly suggested (more or less 
directly), even though the capital structure definition doesn’t distinguish internal 
from external equity7. The importance of funds generated in the firm’s activities 
suggests a significant relation with the capital structure. As it will be showed 
forward, the contexts of its existence and evolution are sources of factors that 
may drive the proportion of leverages allowing for some discussion and theories.  
Dechow (1994) reflected on the matter of earnings defining them as “the 
summary measure of firm performance produced under the accrual basis of 
accounting”. In a footnote, this article states the earnings to be the “aggregate of 
cash flows and accruals”. The advantages stated are to mitigate the problems 
related to revenue recognition and matching principles that cash statements have 
difficulties in accomplish. The accruals allow for the firms to report a revenue 
when the majority of the service have been performed and the cash receipt is 
reasonably certain (revenue recognition principle) and allows also that the cash 
receipt may be recognized in a period different than when the revenue was 
recognized (matching principle). The quoted paper showed that the earnings are 
a better proxy to reflect the expected cash flows than the realized cash flows can 
provide.  
Even though, the earnings concept has disadvantages as the paper assumes 
problems relying on the possibility of manipulation. Fernandez (2017) considers 
that in the accounting criterion rely some possibility for the managing of net 
                                               
7 The definition of leverage is broadly considered to be the proportion of debt in the total 
assets value (as in the general literature as is example Frank & Goyal (2009)), where the 
remaining percentage can be viewed as the equity claim proportion (undistinguishing the 
internal from external influence) 
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income. The paper presents some points where among them lie the use of 
accruals and the revenue recognition for earnings management purpose, but also 
the capitalizing expenses in assets value, extraordinary profits from sales of what 
where until then undervalued assets, and the consolidation form of companies’ 
acquisitions.  Hence, when we value the income statements, we must consider 
the private information of managers allows them to manipulate the accounting 
reports in order to present a “more suitable information”. The evidence of 
occurring phenomenon as earnings smoothing (Das, Hong, & Kim, 2012) and 
manipulation (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996) 8  suggest the existence of 
information asymmetries and consequently agency conflicts related to this 
matter.  
So, the internal equity is built by results of the activities of the company (as 
defined for empirical purposes in Park & Pincus (2001)) that correspond in part 
on the cash flows provided by the economic activities and financial activities9. 
The earnings manipulation may confer results provided from other sources that 
doesn’t relate with cash (as changes in measurements criterion). In what is 
considered the internal equity to be used for investment purposes, in the 
“economic side” of the balance sheet the liquidity plays the role of major 
importance that has consequence on the incentive the hoardings of liquidity or 
building financial slack. 
2.3.1. Liquidity 
The “financial slack” as discussed in Myers & Majluf (1984) considers the cash 
holdings, liquid assets and unused borrowing power. The “Liquidity Preference 
Theory” of Keynes (1936) considered demand for liquidity to be influenced by 
three motives: the “transactions-motive”, the “precautionary-motive” and the 
“speculative-motive”. The transactions-motive explains the business demand of 
liquidity for facing the inherent transactions (whether for facing the expenditures 
of normal course of firm’s activities or for be able to invest in new projects). The 
precautionary-motive regard the holding of liquidity to safeguard against 
                                               
8  Both earnings smoothing and earnings manipulation refer to management practices of 
realizing information about firm performance that manipulate the results in order to avoid 
volatility or negative returns near zero respectively. 
9 Market timing theory suggests the pursue of gains through financing operations. 
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unexpected future needs. The last one alludes to the need of liquidity holdings 
in order to pursue gains with speculation on financial markets.  
Of course, the benefits of holding liquidity are not only available for the sake 
of the firm’s progress, but origins also a conflicting relation between manager 
and the outside investors. As already reviewed, asymmetric information and 
agency theory, presents different views on the benefits of holding liquidity for 
the manager, as also behavioral theories such as the presented managerial 
optimism. This means that the manager’s characteristics tend to influence the 
management activity, voluntarily (shareholders aim to maximize its benefits, 
power and consumption) or involuntarily (biasness of performance estimations), 
which will be reverberated on the evolution of liquidity and consequently in the 
capital structure. 
2.3.1.1. Cash Holdings  
Cash holdings10 correspond to the amount of cash held by the companies in the 
most liquid way, usually as deposits, but it is also the least profitable asset. It is 
hold in order to face the company’s dues, having also the benefits and risks yet 
described. To solve the problem of idle money (returns under the rate of risk-free 
assets) the firms may invest in some securities that are considered as equivalents 
for the easiness of converting into cash in the market (marketable securities). 
Opler et al. (1999) found evidence that supports the static tradeoff model of 
cash holdings. The tradeoff cited consist on the benefits and costs of holding cash. 
For the main benefits considered were the savings in transaction costs on fund 
raisings (avoiding asset liquidation) and the availability when external finance is 
not available. For the downside considers the low (or none) rate of return and 
possible tax disadvantages. The theory behind the tradeoff consist on finding the 
optimal amount of cash in which the marginal cost of holding cash corresponds 
to its marginal benefit. Being that explained, it may be inferred that there are two 
possible tradeoffs in what concerns the cash flow management: one approach 
concerning costs and other more behavioral.  
Being in a shortage position in liquid assets11, the firm may build more reserves 
by raising funds in financial markets, asset liquidation, reducing dividends and 
                                               
10  Cash holdings are usually defined as cash and marketable securities, or cash and cash 
equivalents (Opler et al., 1999) 
11 “We define a firm to be short of liquid assets if it has to cut back investment, cut back 
dividends, or raise funds by selling securities or assets” (Opler et al., 1999) 
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investment and/or by some renegotiation of existing contracts, as quoted in the 
paper.  
It is important to mention the importance of cash flows as they are the actual 
builder of the cash holdings. The cash flow reflects the cash movements of the 
firm that the cash flow statement considers to be from operating, investing or 
financing activities. It “is an objective measure, a single figure that is not subject 
to any personal criterion” as Fernandez (2017) emphases when comparing to the 
use of net income. The paper differentiates four different types of cash flow: The 
“free cash flow” that represents the cash flow generated by the company without 
taking into account the dues of outside claims (debts and shareholders); the 
“equity cash flow” that represents the cash flow due to the equity holders after 
consider the debt claims of the period and tax shields; the “debt cash flow” 
considers the exchanges between firm and debtholders without the tax shields; 
Finally the “capital cash flow” is the cash flow balance of the money exchanges 
between firm and providers of funds (equity and debt).  
Jensen (1986) defined free cash flow as the “cash flow in excess of that required 
to fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the 
relevant cost of capital”. His theory, as already approached, suggests that the 
excess of cash made from operational cash flows that were not offset by capital 
expenditures builds the financial slack, which is the source of agency conflicts 
and that puts in jeopardy the firm performance. This excess is argued to be 
related to the unavailability of good investment opportunities (which may lead 
to investments in less profitable projects) as Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrikx (2000) 
and evidenced. They concluded that firms with low amounts of free cash flow 
achieve a better performance alerting for the problems of very high amounts of 
free cash flow, and the importance of governance factors to mitigate those 
problems. However, the free cash flow theory testing induces the perception that 
the capital expenses must be made in the exercise period of the statements in 
order to get low amounts of free cash flow offsetting the most basic function of 
the free cash flow that is the building the financial slack for the next periods. 
2.3.1.2. Unused Borrowing Power 
The last form of liquidity, that is claimed is the unused borrowing power. In 
defining the liquidity, the credit lines appeared to be an important part as 
suggested in Emery (1982) and Emery & Cogger (1982), proving its importance 
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as the inclusion of this variable provided more reliable information companies’ 
solvency and classification of failed/non-failed. A credit line is considered a debt 
claim from the bank, whereas the unused borrowing power is what is considered 
as liquidity (unused part of the credit line). Sufi (2009) approaches this 
instrument that is given to firms in form of credit lines finding that it is an 
instrument that is related with profitability (that makes the firms reliable on 
future payments promises) and comes also with more covenants attached for 
bank monitoring. As quoted in the paper, “lines of credit provide flexibility, but 
that flexibility is closely managed”. So, the definition provided is the follow: 
“loan commitment or revolving credit facility, provides a firm with a nominal 
amount of debt capacity against which the firm draws funds”. The upside is that 
the bank provides to the firm an instrument that allows the bank an easy source 
of funding within limits. The downside of this instrument, besides the inherent 
cost, is that by the covenants, a firm may be denied the usage of the remaining 
borrowing power in case of bad performance, and that is where the agency 
conflicts may arise more severely. The lines of credit don’t constitute all the 
borrowing power that a firm can get but allows an easy understanding on the 
dynamics of the borrowing power of the firm, since the bad returns increase the 
risk premium and therefore compromise the access to other forms of external 
funding namely debt financing.  
The debt and cash stated as negative debt. The first premise presented by 
Acharya, Almeida, & Campello (2007) is the fact some valuation models find net 
debt (debt less cash) as the variable to determine leverage. The seniority of debt 
claims gives the enforce the argument that the most liquid (less risky) assets are 
managed side by side with debt12. Also related to debt, cash holding decrease the 
likelihood of financial distress (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). So, Acharya et al., 2007 
enforces the differentially between cash and debt, firstly by enlightening the 
functions across time. As stated, the firms try to match the available funds to the 
investment opportunities over time. For that purpose, the firms may control the 
issuing of debt and the amount of cash held. For an issuance of debt, by keeping 
the proceeds the firm transfers resources to the present, while the saving of 
borrowing power transfers the easiness of funding to the future. The model used 
assumes an indifference between debt and cash for unconstrained firms, relying 
                                               
12  “(…) creditors have priority over a fraction of cash balances, and [...] cash flows from new 
investment opportunities are pledgeable (…)” 
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the study relevance on constrained firms. There, they find that the correlation 
between cash flows and investment opportunities (hedging needs) influence the 
preference for holding cash, which tends to happen more in contexts of high 
hedging needs. In cases of low hedging needs they found that the tendency is to 
behave like unconstrained firms and aim to reduce outstanding debt with the 
excess cash flows. 
2.4. Argument of The Paper 
This view on the principal theories may end with a the simple conclusion 
offered by Myers (2001): “There is no universal theory of debt-equity choice, and 
no reason to expect one. There are several useful theories however”. There are 
several studies that provide evidence that consists, contradicts, or does neither 
or both at the same time. This may mean that the theories may be applied as a 
function of the context, since financial decisions may be done for tactic or 
strategic objectives, among other reasons. The complementarity of theories is 
thereby needed for understanding the financing decisions.  
Empirical tests matched theories in diverse contexts, some more robust than 
others, hence this paper aims to enlighten the existence of the several tradeoffs 
found in literature as already mentioned. Several tests found evidence 
supportive of the tradeoff (theory) between debt and equity13, meanwhile some 
others found evidence supportive on the existence of a tradeoff between the 
portions of cash holdings and debt14. The existence of both tradeoffs may suggest 
an articulation between pecking order and the tradeoff theories. The argument 
for this suggestion relies on the observation that tradeoff theories focus on the 
existence of an optimal amount of use of financing sources chosen between a pair 
of the existent while the pecking order theory articulates three main financing 
sources establishing an order of preference for the choice of the financing sources 
to use. By looking at the tradeoffs provided in the referred literature, the 
dichotomies refer to both connections between preferences15. A possible theory 
                                               
13 As Frank & Goyal (2009), Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim (1984); Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, & 
Smith (2012); Flannery & Rangan (2006) 
14  Opler et al., 1999 was one of the most important. Managerial Optimism enlightens a 
behavioristic tradeoff between the two matters with results similar of opposing conclusions of 
adverse selection and agency theory. 
15 Being the two tradeoffs the Internal equity/debt (corresponding to the connection between 
the first and second preferred choices in the pecking order Theory) and debt/equity 
(correspondent to the connection between the second and third preference in pecking order 
Theory). 
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may be that while the pecking order theory suggests the preference of the use of 
financing sources, the tradeoff theory predicts the boundaries of their usage.  
Empirical studies made proved the dynamics of the capital structure adopted 
by firms by observing factors that are considered to be an influence for this matter 
and analyzing the match with the predictions interpreted from theories. 
Regarding the two tradeoffs referred, this paper aims to analyze the determinants 
of capital structure side by side with the determinants of the cash holdings. The 
comparison between the main determinants found on literature brought to light 
some similarities for which ones are most important. By analyzing the 
determinants in both contexts at the same time it may be seen the influence of 
each one in each tradeoff, enlightening the ones that are coincident and those that 
are specific to each tradeoff. The final goal is to understand how important the 
liquidity management is and how does this matter influence the capital structure 
of firms.  
In order study the most important determinants of the capital structure, Frank 
& Goyal (2009) made an empirical study over some of the most used or 
enlightened in the literature. They found some of the more robust factors that 
influence the capital structure, pointing to six of them as the “core factors”. On 
the other hand, studies relying on the cash holdings matters enlighten the 
determinants of the liquidity amounts, however there is no reference to my 
knowledge of a study made in the same line as the Frank & Goyal (2009) for the 
weight of cash holdings. Nevertheless, some papers 16  have been pointed to 
address this issue, providing the liquidity determinants that may be used in 
order to make the suggested comparison of this paper.  
  
                                               
16 Opler et al. (1999) may be the major reference to this issue, as long as Acharya et al. (2007) 




Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
To address the question of this paper, there is used a sample of firms that are 
present on the most representative indexes of the developed countries namely 
the S&P500 stock index (for the U.S.A.) and the STOXX600 (for the European 
firms). The sample was chosen for the similitudes (as diversified in number of 
firms and sectors of activity) between those two regions, and also for the fact that 
both economies faced identical crisis in similar periods. In order to incorporate 
the economic fluctuations, the date comprehend the interval between 2001 and 
2016 starting with the “Dotcom bubble crisis” passing the period where occurred 
the subprime crisis and the sovereign debt crisis until the most recent available 
data.17 In “Methodology” there will be explained with more detail the treatment 
of the sample. 
3.2. Variables and Hypothesis 
In order to understand the importance of the cash management on leverage 
choice, and as said in the “Literature Review”, this paper will focus on the 
analysis and comparison of the perceived impact of the determinants found to 
explain two main variables: leverage and cash holdings. In “Methodology” will 
be explained the methods in order to address the “how to do the analysis” but 
before that, for a better understanding there must be presented the variables 
related with the determinants aimed to be analyzed. In the Table 1 (Appendix I) 
are represented the variables and the correspondent determinants (Factors) and 
their relation, and the computations are present in the Table 2 (Appendix II) 
                                               
17 As reviewed in the Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, & Hirsch (2016), Ravier & Lewin (2012) and 
Junior & Franca (2012) 
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3.2.1. Dependent Variables 
The two main variables that this paper aims to explain as already quoted are 
the proportion of leverage and cash holdings. Several approaches were made and 
tested for this matter and so this work aims to use not only the better approaches 
known but also articulate some rationales in order to get, if possible, more robust 
approaches.  
Firstly, to enumerate the best references for the explanatory variables (to my 
knowledge), it will be considered: 
• Leverage – total book value of debt/market value of assets – as in Frank 
& Goyal (2009) 
• Cash holdings – cash and marketable securities/net assets – as in 
Ferreira & Vilela (2004) 
• Net Leverage – net debt/book value of assets – as in Acharya et al. 
(2007) (even though in there is used in a dynamic way) and it will be 
used in order to help the analysis of the influence of cash holdings on 
leverage.  
The articulations proposed by this work treat subjects like the usage of the 
proxies for debt and assets, depending on the usage of net or total values or 
market or book values. Frank & Goyal (2009) approached the last pair of 
possibilities for the consideration on leverage, but for example Acharya et al. 
(2007) suggest the usage of net debt for a better understanding of the influence 
of the cash holdings on debt levels. Ferreira & Vilela (2004) and Opler et al. 
(1999) use the net assets for determining the cash holdings, which is different 
from the other two variables that use both the dichotomy book versus market 
value. For that matter and in order to get a better comparison, there will be 
kept the three numerators, but the denominators will be target for changes. 
3.2.2. Independent Variables 
The independent Variables aim to reproduce the most important determinants 
found in the literature. Since the paper departed from the view of mutual 
determinants (based on most relevant papers already mentioned) in the 
independent variables the explanation will start with those variables followed by 
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some specifics (also based on the same papers) and others (from remaining 
approached literature) that will be also tested as will be specified in the 
characterization of each variable. The determinants were chosen in order to 
aggregate the influences found in the literature about the most relevant theories. 
Following the papers of Frank & Goyal (2009) as the reference for the most 
important determinants of leverage and the of Ferreira & Vilela (2004), Acharya 
et al. (2007) and Opler et al. (1999) as references for the most important 
determinants of cash holdings, some similarities are found related to the 
following determinants (between parentheses is the factor name used in the 
empirical study) : 
3.2.2.1. Size (size) 
• Measured as the logarithms of assets where concerning the last four 
referenced papers, only Acharya et al. (2007) used a different measure, 
although the proxy used (log of sales) was also reliable. The remaining 
three used the Log Assets as a measure of firm size.  
o The predictions relying the leverage degrees explained by Frank 
& Goyal (2009) claims a positive relation with size as they face 
lower default risk, lowering the cost of capital related to debt as 
a tradeoff prediction.  
o Relating the cash holdings predictions Ferreira & Vilela (2004) 
argue that the trade-off theory predicts a negative relation 
between size and cash holdings. This is due to the economies of 
scale18 relating the cash management, the incentive to retain cash 
as the costs of raising capital are higher for small firms and 
finally the probability of distress costs is reduced in larger firms. 
The pecking order theory predicts more availability for cash as 
larger firms are probably more successful and thus are available 
to retain more cash. Ferreira & Vilela (2004) also suggest the 
predictions relating agency theory arguing a positive relation 
due to managerial discretion enlightened by the shareholder 
dispersion tendency empowering the manager in investment 
and resources allocation ending in more reserves of cash. They 
                                               
18 See Miller & Orr (1966) 
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complement the empowering argument with the probability of 
the firms being targets of takeovers in larger firms is reduced 
comparing to smaller firms. 
3.2.2.2. Growth (Tobin’s Q) 
• It is the Market-to-book value ratio that confers a proxy of investment 
opportunities also associated with growth19. The variable essential as 
seen that growth is the base for valuation purposes as seen in the 
“Gordon’s Model”20 and in other valuation models and traduces the 
expectations of future performance.   
o About leverage, Frank & Goyal (2009) argue a negative relation 
explained by the tradeoff theory, as growth opportunities rise 
the financial distress costs as the risk is increased, and increase 
value for the shareholders. The pecking order theory expect a 
positive relation as the debt is expected to be accumulated in 
response to the investment opportunities. The agency theory 
also predicts a negative relation as the growth opportunities 
solve free cash flow problems and rise debt agency conflicts.  
o Concerning cash holdings, Ferreira & Vilela (2004), the tradeoff 
theory predicts a higher probability of cash shortage when 
facing investment opportunities, inducing a higher need for cash 
and therefore a positive influence of growth in cash holdings. 
The pecking Order theory also predicts a positive relation due to 
the demand for cash to pursue investment opportunities is 
preferred to be financed internally to avoid external costs and 
therefore implies a pursuance of profitable investments. In what 
concerns the free cash flow theory predictions, it is quoted that 
in the firms with poor investment opportunities managers tend 
to ensure availability of funds to invest in growth projects even 
if they are negative projects destroying value. Therefore, the 
market-to-book value is expected to have a negative relation 
with cash holdings.  
                                               
19 Used in the papers used as reference for the empirical work among other literature. 
20 See (Gordon & Shapiro, 1956) and (Gordon, 1959) 
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3.2.2.3. Dividend Policy (Dividends) 
• In Frank & Goyal (2009) the dividend policy was studied in order to 
address the influence on leverage, finding, by using a dummy variable, 
that dividend paying firms tend to have lower portions of debt 
inducing a negative and significant relation. Acharya et al. (2007) used 
this a s grounding to infer the financial constraints. 
o As explained in the agency theory, shareholders prefer the 
earnings distribution in forms of cash as prevention of 
managerial overinvestment. The fact that debt is described by 
the theory to be an instrument with monitoring power, the 
existence may be related with the “obligation” of manager to 
disburse some cash hoardings, which may be the foundation of 
the results founded by the quoted paper. On the other hand, 
leverage is predicted to rise after the dividend payment as the 
proportion of internal equity drops from the disbursement.  
o Concerning cash holdings, the disbursement of cash to pay 
dividends is expected to lower the proportion of cash on the 
firm’s book value. 
 
In Frank & Goyal (2009) the most important determinants besides the ones 
already quoted the following21: 
3.2.2.4. Profitability (Profit) 
• The tradeoff model predictions are suggested to be a positive relation 
with leverage due to the lowering of the probabilities of financial 
distress and consequent costs, which make the tax shields 
advantageous (as the profits increase). The Pecking order predicts a 
negative relation as the profitability allows the retaining of earnings 
that are used. Agency theory predicts the debt to be useful for discipline 
purposes in avoiding agency costs concluding in a positive relation.  
• Concerning cash holdings, the pecking order predictions are 
ambiguous, as the retaining of earnings allow to increase the cash 
holdings, the usage of the same also increase. The trade-off predicts that 
                                               
21 The justification will be given accordingly to the Frank & Goyal (2009) paper. 
I m p o r t a n c e  o f  C a s h  M a n a g e m e n t  i n  F i n a n c i n g  D e c i s i o n s  
 39 
the risk premium decreases in this case supported not by the existence 
of the liquidity in the moment but by the expectations (of future 
performance) that the firm can generate consistently more profits. 
Therefore, the relation between the two variables is expected to be 
negative. 
3.2.2.5. Nature of Assets (Tangibility) 
• The tangible assets are easier to value on the investors perspective 
which allow for less distress costs, making the tradeoff theory expect a 
positive relation as well as agency theory related to debt (tangibility 
inputs difficulty on the shareholder for risk shifting practices). For the 
pecking order the predictions are ambiguous as new external equity 
issuances are less costly with low asymmetry of information provided 
by the already referred easiness of valuing those assets (negative 
relation) and if the asymmetries of information are related to tangible 
assets this tends to increase debt.  
• For the cash holdings prediction didn’t found any theoretical reason to 
induce any prediction. Concerning the rationale of being the cash 
holdings suggested to be negative debt  (Acharya et al., 2007), this 
variable is studied to see if follows the expectation to have the opposite 
relation with cash holdings than it has with leverage. 
3.2.2.6. Expected inflation rate (Expected inflation) 
• It is expected that inflation increases the real value of tax deductions 
making the tradeoff theory predict a positive relation for this variable 
with leverage. The market timing theory expects also a positive relation 
for debt issuances when inflation is relatively high.  
• The value of money in hand is expected to decrease in when the 
inflation rate is positive constituting an opportunity cost, so the 




3.2.2.7. Industry Median Leverage (Industry median debt) 
• The industry standards may capture similarities in the activities that 
traduce into correlations that may influence the leverage degrees. This 
measure is used in order to evaluate the closeness of firms to a target 
capital structure. 
o This Target capital structure is suggested to be proof of the 
tradeoff theory, that predicts a positive relation with leverage.  
o Assuming that the leverage proportion follow the target 
(industry median), it is expected that this variable, the rising of 
the amount of leverage proportion is expected to be connected 
to a low proportion of cash holdings (the cash holdings as 
negative debt rationale). 
3.2.2.8. Industry Median Cash Holdings (Industry median cash 
holdings) 
• For the same purposes the previous one, in this study it will be studied 
is the industry median can suggest a target cash holdings proportion. 
Opler et al. (1999) found evidence of a target adjustment of the cash 
holdings. The effects of this tradeoff are also a target of this study. The 
proving of existence of target proportions of leverage and cash holdings 
is expected to validate the hypothesis of tradeoff theory may be used in 
order to get the boundaries of capital structure.  
o By the tradeoff theory the relation of this variable is predicted to 
have a positive influence on cash holdings as it constitutes a 
target. 
o For leverage, the rising of the amount of cash holdings is 
expected to be connected to a low proportion of leverage (the 
cash holdings as negative debt rationale). 
3.2.2.9. Cash Holdings Average (cash holdings average) 
• Orlova (2017) presents a study relying on different measures of targets 
for cash holdings. The deviations from the variable presented before 
were also analyzed, but the deviations from this variable presented 
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more robust conclusions. The predictions about this variable are 
expected to be the same as the last determinant presented. 
 
The cash holdings related papers the most common important determinants 
differing from the above imply the cash flows performance. The reference paper 
for the predictions of relation between cash holdings and the following variables 
are found in Ferreira & Vilela (2004):  
3.2.2.10. Free Cash Flow (Free Cash Flow) 
• Even though the related paper uses the cash flow as a proxy free cash 
flow, following definition provided by Drake (2008), the free cash flow 
is inferred by subtracting the capital expenditures to operating cash 
flows. It will be used in the same rationale as in the papers dividing by 
the book value of assets. As a variable that reflects the firm 
performance, this variable has the same predictions as Profitability. 
o The tradeoff theory predicts that, as cash flow is considered a 
cash substitute (ready source of liquidity), the relation between 
free cash flow and cash holdings is negative. The pecking order 
in this case predicts a positive relation as the higher free cash 
flow allows for more retained cash. 
3.2.2.11. Cash Flow Uncertainty (Industry Sigma) 
• The proxy for uncertainty of the cash flows are based on the evolution 
of the sectors among the most important literature followed on this 
paper.  
o The uncertainty is predicted to have a positive relation with cash 
Holdings as it increases the probability of cash shortage, which 
induce in a precautionary motive for holding more cash (tradeoff 
theory).  
o In what concerns leverage the predictions are for a negative 
relation tradeoff (the uncertainty rises risk premium, and the 
external sources of financing become more expensive) a positive 
relation expected by the pecking order theory as the volatility of 
cash flows induce the need to access external capital markets 




In the same papers other interesting figures arise to influence the cash 
holdings, and as this paper aims to study, may induce the proportion of leverages 
as follows: 
3.2.2.12. Working Capital (Net working capital) 
• This measure is used in order to address the possible substitutes for 
liquid assets as securitization of receivables or factoring Opler et al. 
(1999), and was also used in Ferreira & Vilela (2004).  
o The predictions are for a negative relation with cash holdings as 
it turns to be a measure for a substitute of liquidity (tradeoff 
theory). The pecking order predicts that the variable lowers 
leverage it means a good performance of the short-term assets 
that help to generate cash that helps to build cash holdings. 
o Concerning leverage, the relation is expected to be positive for 
the argument of cash being negative debt. The net working 
capital measures the capacity of the firm meet its short-term 
obligations which means that the better the company’s net 
working capital is, the leverage is expected to increase by the 
tradeoff as the firm may rise the short-term debt.  
3.2.2.13. Hedging needs  
Acharya et al. (2007)  presented a study where the hedging dimension proved 
to influence both the proportions of leverage and cash holdings. The results 
showed the hedging needs may be managed with the cash holdings as well as 
using derivatives. The paper uses two measures of hedging needs based on 
correlations. In both, the increase in the coefficients is assumed to mean a 
decreasing in hedging needs.  
• Correlation of cash flow or free cash flow with Industry Median 
Research and Development (Hedging research and development (cash 
flow) or Hedging research and development (free cash flow)) 
• Correlation of cash flow or free cash flow with Industry Median Sales 
Growth (Hedging sales growth (cash flow) or Hedging sales growth 
(free cash flow)) 
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o The industry median Research and Development and the 
industry median sales growth are proxies found in the reference 
paper relating the investment opportunities. High positive 
correlations with cash flows indicate lower hedging needs, thus 
the firm don’t tend to hoard cash flows, which predicts a 
negative relation with cash holdings. 
o About the leverage, as lower hedging needs are predicted to 
incentive the disbursement of the cash, for the correlations being 
high the leverage proportions are expected to lower (as the cash 
flows may be used to reduce debt – pecking order). For high 
hedging needs (low correlation) the proportion leverages are 
likely to increase, as the expected optimal policy involves issuing 
debt, as it is expected that the hoardings of cash influence 
positively the capacity to issue debt (debt holders have priority 
over cash pledges).  
The above variables were found in the referred reference literature to be more 
significant to explain leverage and cash holdings. Nevertheless, this study 
proposes other variables found in other related literature that were considered to 
be significant for this study purposes.  
 
Literature find this behavior to be found on issuance/repurchase of stock and 
debt due to favorable market conditions. The variables meant to be studied the 
stock issuance and repurchase and the yield spread (interest rates). Market 
timing may explain the contexts that lead to the financing decisions made but the 
influences of the decisions on capital structures are observed by the direct 
influence as explained following 
3.2.2.14. Stock Issuance (Stock issuance) 
• The issuance of financial instruments that are aimed to be done for 
market timing purposes have an impact on the capital structure. The 
suggested predictions are: 
o In order to explain leverage, a stock issuance will raise the equity 
claims, which has a consequence on the lowering the proportion 
of debt and therefore assumed a negative relation. 
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o For the cash holdings, the issuance will capture funds from 
investor that may end in the cash reserves, so a positive relation 
may be predicted. 
3.2.2.15. Stock Repurchase (Stock repurchase)  
• The repurchase due to market timing, may be made in situations of 
market undervaluing, and this has a consequence for the subject of this 
paper as follows: 
o The leverage may be positively influenced by a repurchase since 
a portion of equity claimants may disappear (which raises the 
proportion of debt indirectly, and the repurchase may be funded 
by a debt commitment.  
o For the cash holdings, it is expected a negative relation as it is 
expected a disbursement in order to pay the dues. 
3.2.2.16. Expected Interest Rates (Yield Spread) 
• Subsequent to the subprime and sovereign debt crisis, the 
macroeconomic conditions around Europe and America were 
characterized by low and even negative yields. Quantitative easing 
policies on central banks were made and influenced the firm’s 
investment opportunities by lowering the discount rates. The risk-free 
rate benchmark lowered and influenced also the debt obligations 
valuation22. Faulkender (2005) found evidence that the shape of the yield 
curve is significant in determining the issuance of firm’s debt to be 
characterized as fixed term rate or floating, which may consider the 
problematic of market timing of debt and hedging purposes. This 
determinant is directly suggested to be related with the debt cost of 
capital. The lower the yield spread is the higher is the expectation on a 
possible future crisis.  
o The predictions are a negative relation concerning cash holdings 
(as the crisis leads increasing hedging needs) and therefore a 
positive relation with leverage.  
                                               
22 Shi (2018) 
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3.2.2.17. Adverse Selection (Earnings Per Share Surprise) 
• The adverse selection theory reflects the importance of market 
perception on the firm performance. As this variable informs about 
market expectations on future performance, here will be used in order 
to capture the influences of the managers perception to make decisions. 
Following evidence on the importance of a consensus analyst forecast 
play on the capital markets, Brown, Hillegeist, & Lo (2009), this variable 
may be very reliable for valuation of information asymmetries that 
influence the market value of a firm and for that cause, the proportion 
of debt on it.  
o It is expected that high negative surprises conclude high 
information asymmetries.  Following the arguments presented 
on the literature review, the usage of cash holdings has the 
benefit of providing the owner more power to decide, and less 
information released. This means that by the pecking order, the 
proportion of cash holdings is likely to be high in the presence 
of information’s asymmetries, thus a negative relation between 
cash holdings and the variable defined. 
o For leverage purposes, and also stated in the literature review, 
the presence of the information asymmetries leads to a market 
uncertainty about the companies’ value, which means that debt 
cost of financing will increase, leading to the prediction of a 
negative relation between the leverage and Information 
asymmetries, or a positive relation with the measure presented. 
 
3.2.2.18. Over Investment (Over investment) 
• Over investment is a problem approached on agency theory and 
managerial optimism theory. Concerning the last one, the optimism 
was suggested to be associated with higher proportions of debt 
suggested by Oliver (2005) where was relating the portions with the 
consumer confidence index (proxy for CEO confidence). The over 
confidence of managers as suggested by the theory is associated with 
overestimating the investment opportunities. This excessive 
investment and over confidence  is evidenced by (Kim, 2017). This may 
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induce the importance of managerial optimism. In what concerns the 
free cash flow theory, the overinvestment is argued to be due from 
managerial behavior to maximize its utility by making excessive 
investments rather than distribute the reserves. The measure used is the 
correlation of investment and firm performance. Following Fu (2010), 
there is evidence supportive of the correlation of investment and firm 
performance as indicative for over investment (if negative) which may 
be reliable to be tested as a determinant for capital structure and cash 
holdings.  
o For cash holdings it may be induced a negative relation, as the 
first source of funding according to the pecking order are the 
internal equity, meaning that excessive investments will tend to 
require the usage of the cash holdings. The free cash flow theory 
provides a lower correlation (overinvestment) in the presence of 
high cash holdings. 
o For the leverage determining this is predicted to have a positive 
relation for the reasons already quoted and for the probability of 
destroying value of the company has a consequence of having 
the weight of the debt to be heavier. Agency theory considers 
debt as monitoring instrument, which leads to the prediction 
that in the presence of lower levels of debt the correlation will be 
lower which is also traduced in a positive relation. 
3.2.2.19. Risk (Price Volatility) 
Variable important in many valuation models (black Sholes, emery, real 
options,…)23 (Black & Scholes, 1973) 
• Stock price volatility – Measure of the volatility of the value perceived 
in the markets, the stock price volatility presents a measure of risk. 
Frank & Goyal (2009) made some predictions about this measure 
concerning the relation with leverage: 
o The tradeoff theory predicts a negative relation as the volatility 
increases the financial distress costs making the external capital 
expensive. The pecking order predicts the opposite as the 
                                               
23 Black & Scholes (1973); Emery (1982); Emery & Cogger (1982) 
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volatility presents a need for the firms to access the external 
market from time to time to avoid the risk of avoiding shortage 
of cash holdings after being used.  
o The last argument serves to the predictions relating cash 
holdings, as the stock price volatility may be explained from the 
volatility in free cash flows and the pecking order theory 
predicts a search for debt may be would mean a negative 
relation, whereas the tradeoff predicts a positive relation as 
concluded from the cheapness of internal equity comparing to 
external financing. 
The Table 3 (Appendix III) present more synthetically the predictions about 
the coefficients of the factors and the relation with the underlying variable. 
3.3. Methodology 
As already defined the empirical part of this paper aims to discover the 
importance of some variables in determining the relation between the financing 
decisions on the usage of internal equity, debt and equity financing. The 
founding of common determinants in studies about capital structure and 
proportion of liquidity were the major influence on this study24.  
3.3.1. Data Treatment 
The data used will be from the DataStream database concerning annual data 
from 1996 to 2018 from the public firms presented in the indexes of STOXX 600 
and S&P 500. 25  The monetary values were downloaded in euros using the 
DataStream option. 
The data was treated using the group industry classification code provided 
from DataStream in order to erase data from financial firms (codes 4,5 and 6). 
                                               
24 Note that the dependent variables used in studies modeling leverage used in general a 
definition of capital structure as debt to the value of the firm (differing in using book or market 
values, net or gross, …). This definition provides the tradeoff of debt and equity financing usage 
of the firms giving an overview on the behavior of both financing sources at once. For the 
liquidity definitions is generally used the cash holdings to assets, providing the overview of the 
proportions of liquidity.  
25 For the study purpose, was used data from 1996 to 2018 but the process of variables creation 
led to the dropping of the data comprehended between years 1996 to 2000 and 2016 to 2018 with 
the exception of the dependent variables that exist in the year 2016, for the purpose of the model. 
Other missing values existed or created were dropped as explained forward. 
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Using the nation code also provided by DataStream were dropped those firms 
outside Europe (nation codes 643 (Russia) and 784 (United Arab Emirates)). The 
expected inflation and spread rates variables were constructed with data taken 
from OECD Database and the data were dropped in case of missing values. 
The variables were constructed as follow and the computation is also 
described on Table 2 (Appendix II): 
1. Leverage is the ratio of the total debt to market value of assets of the next 
proximate year. The market value of assets is approached as the sum of 
total debt with market capitalization. Work with the last item requires a 
special attention with the measure as it is in millions opposed to the 
thousands used in the remaining variables that measures monetary values.  
2. Cash holdings is addressed as the ratio of cash and equivalents per net 
assets of the next proximate year. The net assets are the book value of assets 
minus the cash and equivalents. 
3. Net Leverage variable is the ratio of the net debt variable provided by 
DataStream divided by book value of assets. 
4. Size is computed as the logarithm of book value of assets. 
5. Tobin’s Q is computed as the ratio of market value of assets divided by its 
book value.  
6. Dividends is given by the ratio of dividends payed per book value of assets.  
7. Profits is the ratio of operating income divided by book value of assets.  
8. Tangibility is the ratio given by dividing net plant, property and equipment 
to book value of assets. 
9. The expected inflation is given by the inflation forecast data provided by 
OECD database representative of the forecast of the annual growth of 
consumer price index. 
10. Median industry debt is approached by computing the median the variable 
defined as leverage for each cluster of industry code and year. the industry 
code used is not the “group industry classification” as used to clean the 
data but instead it was used the industry group variable also provided by 
DataStream. 
11. Median industry cash holdings are approached by the same rationale as the 
previous variable, but for the cash holdings ratio. 
12. Cash holdings average is computed as the average cash holdings for the 
five previous years.  For this is necessary that the data is sorted by firm and 
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year, and then create the variable by computing the formula of five years 
average as in the appendix 
13. The free cash flow is computed as the ratio where the numerator is the 
operating cash flow minus capital expenditures and the denominator is the 
book value of assets 
14. The industry sigma is the industry mean of the firm’s standard deviation 
of cash flows. The cash flow is computed as net cash flow from operations 
minus net cash flow from investing plus cash flow from financing (data 
already in a negative form). 
15. Net working capital is equal to the ratio of working capital minus cash and 
equivalents divided by book value of assets 
16. Hedging research and development (cash flow) is measured as the firm 
correlation of the proper cash flows with the industry median research and 
development book value. 
17. Hedging research and development (free cash flow) has the same 
computation but using the free cash flow proxy and is used in order to 
address the best method. 
18. Hedging sales growth (cash flow) is computed as the firm’s correlation of 
the proper cash flows with the industry median sales expected growth for 
the next three years. For the last variable it is computed first the firm’s 
growth as the net sales from year n+3 minus the net sales from the year n 
and then calculating the consequent growth rate. Then for each industry 
and year it is computed the mean of the referred rates.  
19. Hedging sales growth (free cash flow) has the same computation but using 
the free cash flow proxy and is used in order to address the best method. 
20. Stock issuance is computed as the value of the DataStream variable “net 
proceeds from sale/issue of common & preferred” (stock) divided by the 
book value of assets.  
21. Stock repurchase is the ratio of the DataStream variable “common & 
preferred redeemed, retired, converted, etc.” divided by the book value of 
assets.  
22. Yield spread is computed as the difference between the long-term interest 
rates and the short-term interest rates which are variables provided by the 
OECD database that refer to the government securities rates (namely bond). 
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It is used the German spread rate as the reference for firms from countries 
in the euro-zone. 
23. Earnings per share surprise is the value given by the variable of the 
DataStream earnings per share surprise percentage difference already in 
percentage measure 
24. Over investment is given by the firm’s correlation of the net cash flow from 
investments with the change in operating return on assets. The net cash 
flow from investments in given by the DataStream which doesn’t happen 
with the other part. The operating return on assets is proxied by the 
variable “earnings before interest and taxes” that is divided by the book 
value of assets and then computed the percentage growth from the value 
from year n-1 to year n. 
25. Price volatility is the values given by the variable in DataStream “price 
volatility” that is already in percentage measure. 
26. Unlagged cash holdings is the same as the Cash holdings but for the 
correspondent year of the data. 
 
The data used came with missing values and the process of variables creation 
also created missing values. This matter needed some caution in order to avoid 
biased results. For this purpose, after the first data treatment already mentioned, 
some cuts were made during the process of variables creation. The second round 
of cuts was made after creating the variables numbered from 1 to 5, 7 to 8, 13, 15 
and 25 (the first round concerned the variables token from OECD Database 
numbered as 9 and 22). As suggested in Frank & Goyal (2009), some variables 
may have missing values due to the firm’s lack of report of some specific items 
that can bias the study for requiring the dropping of data unnecessary. The 
procedure used in the quoted article passes to replace the missing values to zero 
for several items from the financial statements. In this study the variables 
numbered as 6, 20 and 21 were processed this way in order to avoid dropping 
variables from missing data that is could be probably due to the inexistence of 
dividends payed, or market movements in what concerns the number of stocks 
outstanding. The earnings per share surprise (23) is replaced as well in order to 
avoid missing reliable data that could be erased from an inexistence of 
estimations. For the construction of variables were followed the same strategy 
for research and development.  
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The third step concerned the construction of the time dependent variables and 
those related with industry standards. The variables number 12, sales growth 
(concerning the variable 18 and 19) and change in ebit (concerning the variable 
24) were computed at this stage as well as the number 10 and 11. After dropping 
the missing values created, for the variables sales growth and cash holdings 
average, erased the data from the period before 2000 (including) and post 2016 
(including).  
After the years dropped, the remaining sample were used to compute the 
sigma for the available period studied (14) and the correlation variables (16 to 19 
and 24). And after that, the missing values generated were dropped.  
The data, as following the procedure of the referenced paper, were winsorized 
at 0,50% level for all variables, which means that the extreme values from the 
data were replaced by the nearest value where the cut off were made.  
The model, as explained in section 3.3.1. has a one-year lag between the 
explained and the explanatory variables. Therefore, there was created a variable 
to replace the independent variables with the values of those variables but on the 
subsequent year. This means that in data, as an example, the leverage in 2008 
corresponds to the value of unlagged leverage in 2009.  
3.3.2. Empirical study development 
The empirical study will be developed following part of the procedure of 
Frank & Goyal (2009). As presented in results, the process will start with a 
statistical analysis of the variables used. The statistics analyzed for all the 
variables will be the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum, the tenth and ninetieth percentile as well as the median 
that corresponds to the fiftieth percentile.  
The second step will be an analysis of a table of correlations between each 
dependent variable with each the explanatory variable. This will be done for the 
overall period, and two partitions of periods that are divided in two groups, the 
first until 2008 and the second from 200926 aiming to represent the period previous 
and post crisis. There will be reported for all variables the correlation coefficient, 
the significances and one signal for each partition period (positive or negative if 
                                               
26 For the dependent variables the division is until 2009 and from 2010 
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the coefficient in the referent period is significant and respectively positive or 
negative, otherwise, the dot represents “not significant”) 
The third step is the regression univariate regressions where each dependent 
variable is regressed with one independent at the time. There will be reported 
the coefficient, the t-statistic, the significance and the r-squared. All the 
regressions done from this to the last step have the standard errors clustered 
robust at both firm and year level27.  
The fourth step aims to choose one variable between each pair of hedging 
needs representation. The decision is based. On the confrontation so results from 
second and third step. The first criterion is to observe the confrontation of results 
of the t-statistics (and significances) and the r-squared of the third step 
regressions. From each pair, the variable that has a t-statistic more distant from 
zero and the higher r-squared in the regressions of two or the three univariate 
regressions is chosen. In case of the first criterion gives ambiguous results, the 
second criterion is equal to the first but only rely on the regressions of net 
leverage 28. If by looking at the t-stat and the r-squared the variables it is not 
possible to choose, the third criterion is to find the variable better correlated with 
the net leverage variable.  
The fifth step aims to finally reproduce the goal of this dissertation. It is a 
reproduction of the table III of Frank & Goyal (2009) for each dependent variable, 
that allows the comparison of influences of variables and adequacy of models. 
This procedure is the basis of selection of the “core variables” that is similar to 
what is aimed to infer for the tree dependent variables. For each one, the process 
of this step starts with a regression with all independent variables already 
defined (minus the dropped in the fourth step). After that it is selected the 
variable with poor performance29 observed to be dropped and then is made a 
regression with the remaining variables repeating the process until the last 
variable. In each regression is reported for the variable with the poorest 
performance the coefficient, the t-statistic, the significance and r-squared of that 
                                               
27 In order to use two-dimension clustered robust standard errors there was installed in Stata 
the ado file that was downloaded from the following site as suggested in Frank & Goyal 
(2009): http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_program
ming.htm.  The suggestion of the reference paper that followed Petersen (2007) to implement 
this procedure. 
28 This dependent variable has its variation based not only in the proportion of debt, but also 
on the proportion of cash holdings subtracted. This means that it may englobe the effects of both 
of the other dependent variables. 
29 The criterions to choose poor performance are first the observed t-statistic closer to zero, 
then the higher significance and for last criterion the t-statistic closer to zero in the univariate 
tests.  
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regression and the Bayesian Information Criterion. The selection criterion of the 
core variables, in Frank & Goyal (2009), is inferred after doing the same process 
for random partitions of the sample (ten equal groups and per years) and 
calculate the percentage that each variable is included in the minimum BIC 
specification. Here, this study differentiates from the reference paper. The same 
described procedure will be repeated not only by grouping variables by year or 
randomly, but for different contexts. The first context was already defined 
explained uses all the variables. The second does the same process taking the 
industry related independent variables that can bias the results30, or offset results 
from other variables misleading their importance. The hedging needs proxies 
were not used also as they are computed by correlations from firm specific 
characteristics and industry characteristics. The third context drops also the 
industry median standard deviation. The fourth context drops the five years 
average cash holdings as it is considered to capture a target for cash holdings and 
in the previous contexts were also dropped the variables of industry where are 
included proxies for targets of leverage and cash holdings. The fifth context uses 
fixed effects that Frank & Goyal (2009) consider to be important but don’t use for 
the difficulty of interpretation. Here the objective is not to make an interpretation 
but see which variables after taking it into account appear to be robust. The same 
premise is used for the sixth and seventh contexts where are taking into account 
the year and industry sector effects.31 
The sixth step is the confrontation of the results given. First it is analyzed the 
number of times the variable was included in the minimum bayesian information 
criterion for each of the three dependent variables. It is calculated a mean 
percentage for each independent variable across the three dependent variables 
and the mean percentage on cash holdings and leverage. This means will be 
calculated in each analysis of the sixth step. The second analysis concerns the 
number of times the independent variable achieved 99% significance, first in total 
regressions that the independent variables were used and second among the 
times the variables were included in the minimum bayesian information 
criterion. The third analysis concerns the signals of the coefficients. First is 
analyzed the percentage of times that each variable had a positive sign, then a 
                                               
30 Sectors with just one firm as an example 
31 Those regressions require the use of fixed effects (firm, year and sector) and the multi-
dimension clustering standard errors (firm and year). For that the code “clustre2” is not able to 
do in Stata, so the code used were “reghdfe” that is able to deal with both conditions. The code 
was downloaded from the site: http://scorreia.com/software/reghdfe/install.html 
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negative sign, and at the end the percentage of times the higher frequent signal 
appeared. The fourth analysis and the fifth analysis are equal to the third but this 
time instead of computing the percentages of signal appearance with the number 
of times the variable was used in each context study, it was used respectively the 
times the variables appeared in the minimum bayesian information criterion and 
times the variable appeared with high significance. This is expected to help to get 
considerations about the matching of expectations concerning the coefficients of 
the independent variables by observing the relations with the dependent ones. 
each time they were dropped32. 
The seventh and last step is the analysis of the results given in the steps made 
so far, provide a possible choosing of the most relevant variables. So, this step is 
a presentation of the regressions and it’s results by choosing the best variables. 
The first presentation is the one that for each dependent variable chooses the 
most relevant33 explanatory variables. The second regresses the three dependent 
variables with the factors considered as common for all the three34. The third 
regresses the three dependent variables with the most relevant explanatory 
variables common between cash holdings and leverage. For fourth presentation 
it is regressed leverage, net leverage and cash holdings using the factors found 
better for leverage and then for net leverage, and a new model is created and 
regressed by adding the unlagged cash holdings to the leverage model and net 
leverage model. The purpose is to find patterns that indicate the influence of cash 
holdings in the capital structure. If the coefficients get closer to the net leverage 
ones from the first model of leverage to the new one it is expected the existence 
of an important influence.    
3.3.3. The Models 
The objective of this study concludes in creation of new models that will be 
presented in the “Results” chapter. The model used is the same as in Frank & 
Goyal (2009) where the linear regressions will study the importance of each factor 
when other important factors are also considered. The models are as follow:  
                                               
32 Every time a variable was dropped in the fifth step, the values of the dropped reports are 
concerned with the regressions made with all the variables that are more significant. 
33 Only those that appear in the minimum bayesian information criterion in all contexts at 
least 80% of the timed that the variables were used having been reported a coefficient’s 
significance at 1% level over 50% of the times that appeared in the first criterion.  
34 The common variables are related with the factors that compose the model in the first 
presentation. 
I m p o r t a n c e  o f  C a s h  M a n a g e m e n t  i n  F i n a n c i n g  D e c i s i o n s  
 55 
• Leveragei,t = α + βFi,t−1 + 𝜀 i,t  
• Cash Holdingsi,t =𝛾 + 𝛿Fi,t−1 + 𝜁 i,t  
• Net Leveragei,t = 𝜌 + 𝜑Fi,t−1 + 𝜌i,t  
 
Where Leveragei,t corresponds to the dependent variable leverage of the firm i 
and year t; Cash Holdingsi,t denotes the dependent variable cash holdings of firm i 
and year t, used as cash hold; Net Leveragei,t denotes the dependent variable net 
leverage of firm i and year t; Fi,t−1 denotes the set of factors of firm i and year t-1. 
α , 𝛾  and 𝜌  represent the constants for each model regressed; β , 𝛿  and 𝜑 
represent the coefficients of the factors used in the models regressed; 𝜀, 𝜁, and 𝜌 
represent the error terms of each regression made. The list of factors used are 
described in the appendix in Tables 1 and 2 (Appendix I and II) and the 




Chapter 4: Results 
4.1. Summary statistics 
The summary statistics are shown for all variables. It is important to consider 
that the sample concerns 6455 observations correspondent to firms and 15 years 
(2001 to 2015 for independent variables and 2002 to 2016 for dependent 
variables). The Table 4 (Appendix IV) discloses the summary of descriptive 
statistics. 
From the three dependent variables, the only one that may consider negative 
values is the net leverage as the minimum shows. The minimum of leverage is 0 
meaning that there are firms with no debt, and from the cash holdings is positive 
meaning that in the sample all firms maintain hoard of cash. The net leverage as 
observed in the tenth percentile comprehends negative values which is due from 
firms that have more hoard of cash than debt. By comparing the maximums and 
minimums is shown, that size and tobin’s Q vary only in positive values. The 
variables yield spread and expected Inflation vary in percentage in a range from 
negative to positive. The same range applies to percentage variables as earnings 
per share surprise earnings per share surprise) and price volatility. The variables 
dividends, stock repurchases and issuances, industry sigma and industry median 
leverage range from 0 to 1, while the remaining variables (ratios and correlations) 
vary in the range -1 to 1.  
4.2. Correlations 
The Table 5 (Appendix V) discloses the values of the correlations found 
between each independent variable with each dependent one. It is also reported 
the signal if the correlations are significant for each period described as before 
and after crisis. Note that for the independent variables with higher correlations 
(as following description) maintain its behavior (same signal and significant) in 
both periods. 
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From the correlations 35  table it is observable that the most positive and 
significant correlations coefficients with leverage are Size (0,3646), Tangibility 
(0,2763), but the higher is the Industry median Debt (0,6240). About the negative 
and significant variables, the most highlighted ones are the Tobin’s Q (-0,4981), 
Free Cash Flow (-0,4136) and Profit (-0,3743). The cash holdings related variables 
also show high negative and significant correlation coefficients (unlagged cash 
holdings with -0.2427, Industry median Cash Holdings with -0.2877 and Cash 
holdings average with a correlation coefficient of -0.2069) as well as Industry 
Sigma (-0,3262). Other variables appear to have high36 negative and significant 
correlations are Dividends, Net Working Capital, Stock Issuance, Stock 
Repurchase, Yield Spread and Over investment.  
Related with the dependent cash holdings variable high positive correlations 
were found for Tobin’s Q, Stock Issuance, Stock Repurchase, Over investment 
and Price Volatility. The highlights are Industry median Cash Holdings (0.5419) 
Cash holdings average (0.7244) and Industry Sigma (0.5119). The most negative 
correlations are from the variables Size (-0.2468), Tangibility (-0.2582), Industry 
median Debt (-0.2547), Net Working Capital (-0.1607) and Profit (-0.1223).  
The net leverage is positively correlated with high levels with Size (0.2820), 
Tangibility (0.3127), Industry median Debt (0.4644). The higher negative 
correlations are from the variables unlagged cash holdings (-0.5567), Tobin’s Q (-
0.3840), Industry median Cash Holdings (-0.4775), Cash holdings average (-
0.4326), Industry Sigma (-0.4491), Price Volatility (-0.3754). Other variables as 
Free Cash Flow, Stock Issuance, Stock Repurchase and Over investment also 
presented high negative correlations with the quoted dependent variable.  
For the “correlation variables”, as the ones that infer the hedging needs were 
found low and negative correlations with leverage for the factors computed as 
Hedging sales growth (free cash flow) and Hedging Research and Development 
(cash flow) where the other pair got low positive coefficients. 
4.3. Univariate tests 
On the Table 6 (Appendix VI) are present the values of the coefficients, t-
statistics, significance and r-squared for all the variables in simple independent 
                                               
35 The significance levels here described are at 1% level 




regressions combining each independent with each dependent variable. The 
result given are similar to those given above. The signals of the coefficients are 
exactly the same as expected.  
In the case of the leverage, all variables are significant at 1%level except for 
Price Volatility (significant at 5% level) Hedging Research and Development (free 
cash flow) (significant at 10% level), Expected Inflation, Hedging Sales growth 
(free cash flow), Hedging Research and Development (free cash flow), Earnings 
Per Share Surprise and Hedging Sales Growth (cash flow). The r-squared higher 
than 0,1 are the variables Industry median Debt, Tobin’s Q Free Cash Flow, Size, 
Profit and Industry Sigma where the first three are the ones that have higher t-
statistic (higher than 10 positive or negative) 
For cash holdings the variables that didn’t present significance in at least 10% 
are Free Cash Flow, Expected Inflation, Hedging Research and Development 
(free cash flow), Hedging Sales Growth (cash flow), Earnings Per Share Surprise, 
Hedging Sales growth (free cash flow), Profit. Both Dividends and Hedging 
Research and Development (free cash flow) presented significance at 5% level. 
The remaining variables presented significance at 1% level. The only variable that 
surpassed the barrier of 10 in the t test is the Cash holdings average and it is also 
highest r-squared. The r-squared that surpassed the 0,10 barrier as well are 
Industry median Cash Holdings, Industry Sigma, Price Volatility, Tobin’s Q and 
finally Stock Issuance. 
Concerning net leverage, the lower significance was found in Expected 
Inflation, Earnings Per Share Surprise, Dividends, Hedging Sales growth (free 
cash flow), Net Working Capital, Hedging Sales Growth (cash flow), Hedging 
Research and Development (free cash flow) 6 and Hedging Research and 
Development (free cash flow) coefficients. The Profit has significance at 10% 
level. The remaining variables found the significance at 1% level and from those 
Industry median Debt and Industry median Cash Holdings perform with the 
higher t-statistic. Considering the r-squared, in addition to the last variables, 
Industry Sigma, Cash holdings average, Tobin’s Q and Price Volatility as well as 
unlagged cash holdings have an r-squared higher than 0,1.  
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4.4. Choosing hedging needs proxy 
The choosing of hedging needs proxy is explained in “Methodology” and after 
following that procedure, the proxy were chosen as follows: 
The process described made the hedging needs proxy based on sales expected 
growth be chosen by a correlation with cash flows instead of using free cash flow. 
The values used in the criterion by observing the Tables 5 and 6 (Appendix V and 
VI) showed that the relations found with net leverage were used to untie the 
decision. For the usage Hedging Sales Growth (cash flow) the information 
provided by the tables, revealed better values in relation with leverage and net 
leverage, opposed to Hedging Sales growth (free cash flow) that only fitted for 
the cash holdings model.  
For correlation with research and development, the free cash flow was chosen 
by recurring to the last criterion. The free cash. flow was better. Correlated for 
cash holdings and the cash flow better for leverage. The net leverage revealed an 
ambiguous decision, in one side the cash flow correlation had better performance 
in significance but, the r-squared was favorable to the free cash flow. The untie 
was made by looking at the correlations between Hedging Research and 
Development (free cash flow) and Hedging Research and Development (free 
cash flow) with net leverage.  
4.5. Factor choosing regressions 
The results provided from the six different contexts studied (Tables 7 to 13 
(Appendix VII to XIII)) are presented as the variables that construct the models 
found by using the minimum bayesian information criterion.37 The significances 
described as follow are related with the significance tests of the coefficients 
referent to the variables referred.  
The first context (Table 7 (Appendix VII)) included all variables and remained 
in the referred criterion for leverage Industry median Debt, Tobin’s Q, Free Cash 
Flow, Size, Dividends, Net Working Capital and Cash holdings average with 1% 
                                               
37  The variables Hedging Research and Development (free cash flow) and Hedging Sales 
Growth (free cash flow) were not included in any context as were dropped in the process 
described in 4.4. 
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level of significance and Hedging Sales Growth (cash flow), Profit, Stock 
Repurchase, Stock Issuance, Yield Spread, Earnings Per Share Surprise and Price 
Volatility.  
In the cash holdings regressions, the minimum Bayesian information criterion 
used contained the following factors: Cash holdings average, Industry median 
Cash Holdings, Stock Issuance, Tangibility, Price Volatility, Yield Spread, Net 
Working Capital, Tobin’s Q, over investment and Size dropped with 1% level of 
significance and Hedging Sales Growth (cash flow), Dividends, Earnings Per 
Share Surprise, Stock Repurchase and Profit.  
The net leverage model included Industry median Debt, Price Volatility, Free 
Cash Flow, Cash holdings average, over investment, Industry median Cash 
Holdings, Net Working Capital, Stock Issuance, Stock Repurchase, Tangibility, 
Hedging Sales Growth (cash flow), where Net Working Capital and Hedging 
Sales Growth (cash flow) were dropped without the having 1% of significance 
level.  
The second context (Table 8 (Appendix VIII)) didn’t include the variables 
related with industry standards Industry median Debt and Industry median 
Cash Holdings and hedging needs proxies. In leverage the model chosen used 
Tobin’s Q, Free Cash Flow, Net Working Capital, Industry Sigma, Size, Profit, 
Tangibility, Cash holdings average, Dividends, Yield Spread and Over 
investment where the last two presented significance levels comprehended only 
at 10% level opposed to the remaining used that presented significance levels 
inside 1%.  
The cash holdings model used Industry Sigma, Stock Issuance, Yield Spread, 
Price Volatility, Tangibility, Net Working Capital that were dropped under 
significance level of 1%, and above it the Tobin’s Q, over investment, Dividends, 
Free Cash Flow, Profit and Stock Repurchase.  
The net leverage in this context found the model to be composed by Price 
Volatility, Free Cash Flow, Industry Sigma, Cash holdings average, Tangibility, 
Net Working Capital, Stock Issuance, Over investment, Stock Repurchase and 
Tobin’s Q, where the first ones were dropped with a 1% level of significance and 
the last for have a significance level between 1% and 10%.  
The third context (Table 9 (Appendix IX)) didn’t include the same variables as 
in the previous context and also Industry Sigma. The model found for leverage 
included Tobin’s Q, Free Cash Flow, Size, Net Working Capital, Cash holdings 
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average, Tangibility, Profit, Dividends, Stock Issuance, Yield Spread, Over 
investment. From those only the last four weren’t dropped with a significance 
level included in 1%. 
In the cash holdings model was found to use Cash holdings average, 
Tangibility, Price Volatility, Stock Issuance, Yield Spread, Tobin’s Q, Net 
Working Capital, Over investment, Free Cash Flow, Profit, Dividends, Stock 
Repurchase and Size, where all the variables were dropped achieving 1% 
significance levels except for the last six. 
The net leverage factors included in the minimum bayesian information 
criterion were Price Volatility, Free Cash Flow, Cash holdings average, 
Tangibility, Net Working Capital, Tobin’s Q, Over investment, Stock Issuance 
and Stock Repurchase, where from those only the last two weren’t dropped with 
1% significance level.  
The fourth context (Table 10 (Appendix X)) didn’t include also Cash holdings 
average, and the best model found for leverage included Tobin’s Q, Free Cash 
Flow, Size, Net Working Capital, Tangibility, Dividends, Stock Issuance, Profit, 
Yield Spread, Over investment, where the dropped factors that didn’t get a 
reported significance level lower than 1% were the last three ones.  
For cash holdings, the model found included Tobin’s Q, Price Volatility, 
Tangibility, Stock Issuance, Net Working Capital, Profit, Yield Spread, 
Dividends, Stock Repurchase and Size where the last four where not included in 
the group of dropped with 1% significance.  
The net leverage factor model included in this context Price Volatility, Tobin’s 
Q, Tangibility, Free Cash Flow, Stock Issuance, Profit, Over investment and Net 
Working Capital where only the last two didn’t achieve 1% significance at the 
stage that were dropped.  
The fifth (Table 11 (Appendix XI)) context used firm fixed effects for all 
available variables excluding the ones that were excluded for collinearity issues 
(Over investment, Industry Sigma, Hedging research and development (cash 
flow) and Hedging Sales Growth (cash flow)). Being all said the leverage factors 
that were chosen are Tobin’s Q, Free Cash Flow, Industry median Debt, Size, 
Stock Repurchase, Profit, Dividends, Yield Spread, where only the first four are 
included dropped with 1% significance level. 
The cash holdings factors selected are Tangibility, Size, Industry median Cash 
Holdings, Net Working Capital, Cash holdings average, Expected Inflation, 
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Industry median Debt, Yield Spread and Price Volatility, where only the first 
three were reported with a significance below 1%.  
The selected factor to explain net leverage are Free Cash Flow, Price Volatility, 
Size, Stock Repurchase, Industry median Cash Holdings, Industry median Debt, 
Tangibility, Profit, Yield Spread where only the last three were dropped without 
reaching 1% of significance.  
The year effects (Table 12 (Appendix XII)) present on the sixth context induce 
that all the factors were included in this study. By this in the leverage results the 
factors included are Industry median Debt, Tobin’s Q, Free Cash Flow, Size, 
Dividends, Net Working Capital, Cash holdings average, Stock Issuance, 
Industry Sigma, Profit, Hedging Sales Growth (cash flow), Price Volatility. Here 
the factors dropped with at least 1 % significance are the first six.  
The cash holdings factors included almost all available except for Industry 
Sigma, Industry median Debt and Hedging research and development (cash 
flow). The most significant ones (significance of 1%) are Cash holdings average, 
Stock Issuance, Industry median Cash Holdings, Tangibility, Price Volatility.  
 The net leverage factor only didn’t include Profit, Size, Hedging research and 
development (cash flow), Earnings Per Share Surprise and Dividends, whereas 
the Industry median Debt, Price Volatility, Free Cash Flow, Cash holdings 
average and Over investment were reported being significant at 1 % level in the 
last regression that they were included.  
The seventh and last context (Table 13 (Appendix XIII)) included industry 
sector effects and for that reason Industry Sigma was not included. Being that 
said, the leverage factors included in this study are Tobin’s Q, Free Cash Flow, 
Size, Dividends, Industry median Debt, Cash holdings average, Net Working 
Capital, Price Volatility, Stock Repurchase, Stock Issuance, Profit and Yield 
Spread, where only the first four are reported with 1% level of significance.  
The cash holdings factors include Cash holdings average, Stock Issuance, 
Tangibility, Yield Spread, Net Working Capital, Size, Over investment, Tobin’s 
Q, Expected Inflation, Industry median Debt, Industry median Cash Holdings 
and Price Volatility, where the first five are reported as 1% significant.  
Finally, for the net leverage the factors included are Price Volatility, Free Cash 
Flow, Cash holdings average, Stock Issuance, Stock Repurchase, Tobin’s Q, Over 
investment, Tangibility, Industry median Debt and Net Working Capital. Here 
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the variables Price Volatility, Free Cash Flow, Cash holdings average and Stock 
Repurchase are reported with 1% level of significance. 
4.6. Signal Consistency Results 
The results concerning the patterns observed on the signals that the 
coefficients of the variables shown (Table 16 (Appendix XVI)) are following 
described firm by firm: 
• Size maintained a positive signal in all the contexts studies for leverage 
regressions and the opposite for the cash holdings. Concerning net 
leverage, the pattern is observed by observing the signals reported 
when the variable was included in the minimum bayesian information 
criterion models, showing a positive signal 100% of the times. These 
results are equally observed by observing the correlations and the 
univariate regressions coefficients.  
• Tobin’s Q in leverage and net leverages were always reported with 
negative coefficients. For cash holdings, the pattern was observed when 
included in the minimum bayesian information criterion models, 
where the coefficients were positive all times. These results are equally 
observed by observing the correlations and the univariate regressions 
coefficients. 
• Dividends got all the coefficients in all studies positive for cash 
holdings and negative for the remaining dependent variables. In the 
correlations and univariate tests, the results of the signals were negative 
for cash holdings and positive for net leverage maintaining the negative 
signal on the coefficient related with leverage.  
• Profit coefficients in all the context studies appeared with a negative 
signal concerning leverage, and by looking to the percentage of time 
that the variable was included in the minimum bayesian information 
criterion, the cash holdings presented also negative signals. In what 
concerns the net leverage, the Profit’ coefficient appears to positive the 
only time it was reported as significant at 1% level. The correlations and 




• Tangibility appeared always with a positive signal related with net 
leverage and the opposite related with cash holdings. When included 
in the minimum bayesian information criterion models the coefficient 
of this variable was always reported as positive for leverage. The results 
are equally found in correlations and univariate regressions. 
• Expected Inflation the coefficients of this variable were found positive 
for net leverage in all regressions, and negative when included in the 
minimum bayesian information criterion models for cash holdings. The 
variable has never appeared with significance as benchmarked. In 
correlations and univariate regressions this variable got positive signs 
but not significant at 10% level for all dependent variables. 
• Industry median Debt found the signals positive for all dependent 
variables in all the contexts, as well as in correlations and univariate 
regressions for leverage and net leverage. The cash holdings related 
coefficients are negative in these two last tests.  
• Industry median Cash Holdings coefficients are negative for leverage 
and net leverage and positive concerning cash holdings as reported in 
all context’s studies and correlations and univariate regressions. 
• Cash holdings average the signals results are found to be equal as in 
Industry median Cash Holdings, the only difference is that the leverage 
signal was only found 100% of the times that included in the minimum 
bayesian information criterion models.  
• Free Cash Flow signals are found in all the contexts negative for 
leverage and net leverage, and positive for cash holdings by looking 
when included in the minimum bayesian information criterion models. 
The results are equally found in correlations and univariate regressions. 
• Industry Sigma appeared related with cash holdings as positive in all 
the context studies. Only by observing the signals when the report was 
significant at 1% level is observable that the remaining variables have 
negative coefficients. These signals are also observable in correlations 
and univariate regressions. 
• Net Working Capital presented in all criterions for all variables a 
negative coefficient. 
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• Hedging research and development (cash flow) presented positive 
coefficients for all context studies but this variable never appeared in 
the minimum bayesian information criterion models neither were 
reported as significant at 1%. The correlations and univariate 
regressions showed a negative coefficient related with cash holdings. 
• Hedging Sales Growth (cash flow) presented negative coefficients in all 
the contexts of studying leverage and net leverage, and positive for cash 
holdings. The same results are observed in correlations and univariate 
regressions. Note that this variable was never reported as significant in 
any of the contexts.  
• Stock Issuance presented coefficients negative for leverage and net 
leverage and positive for cash holdings in all the contexts, criterions, 
and correlations and univariate regressions. 
• Stock Repurchase the signals are the opposite of the Stock Issuance, 
with the difference that only for net leverage the criterions were 
fulfilled (appearance in all contexts with the same signal and being 
reported as significant at 1% level as well) 
• Yield Spread coefficient appeared for leverage to be negative and 
positive for cash holdings in all context studies as well as in correlations 
and univariate regressions. Concerning net leverage, this variable 
doesn’t follow a robust trend (100% of appearances of the same signal 
in any the criterion). The correlations and univariate regressions 
indicate a negative sign and the reports in all the contexts that the 
variable was used the coefficient have a positive signal.  
• Earnings Per Share Surprise appeared in all the contexts with a positive 
coefficient relating cash holdings. When included on the minimum 
bayesian information criterion models, the variable presented a 
positive coefficient related with leverage. About net leverage the results 
are ambiguous as the variable never fulfilled totally the first criterions 
(minimum bayesian information criterion models and significances 
signals). The correlations and univariate regressions have presented 
positive signals in the coefficients of this variable related with leverage 
and cash holdings and negative for the remaining dependent variable. 
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• Over investment, as in the correlations and univariate regressions, 
presented positive coefficients for cash holdings and negative for net 
leverage in all the context studies. For leverage, the signal appeared 
positive 100% of the times that the variable was included in the 
minimum bayesian information criterion models, something 
observable also in the correlations and univariate regressions. 
• Price Volatility coefficient appeared in all the context studies reported 
with a negative signal for net leverage and positive for cash holdings. 
The correlations and univariate regressions also support the same 
observation except for leverage where was found negative coefficients 
opposed to the positive values found in all times that the variable was 
included in minimum bayesian information criterion models. 
4.7. Factor Choosing Results  
The comparing the results on the Tables 14 and 15 (Appendix XIV and XV) it 
is possible to observe which factors are used in the minimum bayesian 
information criterion models for the seven contexts presented, and the 
percentage of times its coefficient were significant at 1% level.  
So, it is possible to observe that for leverage, the variables that were included 
in the minimum bayesian information criterion in all contexts are Size, Tobin’s 
Q, Dividends, Profit, Industry median Debt and Free Cash Flow, where Size, 
Tobin’s Q and Free Cash Flow have the coefficients statistically significant at 1% 
level in all reports.  
The cash holdings most used factors in the minimum bayesian criterion 
models are Tangibility, Industry median Cash Holdings, Cash holdings average, 
Net Working Capital, Yield Spread and Price Volatility where from these, the 
only coefficient that were significant at 1% level was Tangibility (Industry Sigma 
and Stock Issuance were always significant in all the times that were included in 
the minimum bayesian information criterion). 
Net leverage factors that appeared 100% of the times in the minimum bayesian 
information criterion are Tangibility, Industry median Debt, Free Cash Flow, 
Over investment and Price Volatility. In this case the significance criterion 
highlighted Free Cash Flow and Price Volatility (Size and Cash holdings average 
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were always significant in all the times that were included in the minimum 
bayesian information criterion).  
The comparison of behavior of the coefficients signals of the variables when 
included in the minimum bayesian information criterion and when the 
coefficients are found significant at 1% level provided robust results about the 
behavior of the independent variables and the influence on the dependent ones. 
First, all of the variables maintained the signal in all the regressions where they 
were used before being dropped in the context study when their coefficients were 
significant at 1% level. The variables that didn’t appear to be significant more 
than one time are for leverage the Industry Sigma and Stock Issuance, for cash 
holdings the Profit and Industry Sigma, and for net leverage Size, Profit, Industry 
Sigma and Stock Issuance. In the inclusion of the minimum bayesian information 
criterion all the variables maintained the same signal except Industry Sigma for 
leverage studies where were included two times in the criterion with different 
signals in each time. The same happened with net leverage in relation with also 
Industry Sigma as well as Profit and Yield Spread.  
4.8. Resulting Models 
The criterion for determination of the models is expressed in the methodology. 
The results observed and following that methodology provided the following 
models (Table 17 (Appendix XVII)) where all the variables have coefficients 
significant at 1% level excepting for the Net Working Capital and Stock 
Repurchase in the regression of net leverage. The signals of the coefficients 
appeared in the regression of the following models with the same trend as 
described in the 4.6. section.  
• The Leverage factors fulfilled the criterion selections are Size, Tobin’s 
Q, Dividends, Industry median Debt, Cash holdings average, Free Cash 
Flow, and Net Working Capital. In this case Industry median Debt 
assumed the highlighted performance in terms of t-statistic (14,83) 
more than the double of the absolute value of the second-best 
performance (Free Cash Flow with -7,29).  
• For Cash Holdings the same criterion determined the factors chosen to 
be Tangibility, Industry median Cash Holdings, Cash holdings 
average, Net Working Capital Stock Issuance, Yield Spread and Price 
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Volatility. The highlight performance in terms of t-statistic for this 
variable is Cash holdings average (12,12) that is almost the triple of the 
second-best absolute values that are related with Stock Issuance and 
Industry median Cash Holdings (4,55).  
• Net Leverage chosen model is composed by is Industry median Debt, 
Cash holdings average, Free Cash Flow, Net Working Capital, Stock 
Repurchase and Over investment and Price Volatility. The highest t-
statistic is Industry median debt, but the value of the t stat is closer to 
the following variables (Free Cash Flow with -8,79 and Price Volatility 
with -7,87).   
The methodology approached and criterions provide observation of variables 
that Cash holdings average and Net Working Capital to be the common presence 
of the three models above described (Table 18 (Appendix XVIII)). The signals 
were found equal as in the regressions above and the significance levels were 
found to be included in 1% level as well. In net leverage the Net Working Capital 
coefficient was negative as in the other regressions. In the regression of cash 
holdings this variable had lower t-stat and coefficient (absolute number) than in 
leverage but the net leverage values were in the middle of both closer to the 
values found in cash holdings regression. The Cash holdings average have higher 
positive coefficient than the negative coefficient found by using to regress cash 
holdings and the net leverage coefficient is in the middle and closer to the one 
found after regress leverage. The t-stat became similar between leverage and net 
leverage.  
These last models are composed by the only factors that are observed to be 
common between leverage and cash holdings. 
The following study results (Table 19 (Appendix XIX)) are from the considered 
as fourth presentation in “Methodology”) relates the usage of Size, Tobin’s Q, 
Dividends, Industry median Debt, Cash holdings average, Free Cash Flow, and 
Net Working Capital to regress the three dependent variables and a fourth 
regression where the unlagged cash holdings is added as described in 
“Methodology”. The signals in the four regressions follow the same trend 
described in the section 3.6. for almost all variables. The different signals are 
found in the regression of net leverage for the coefficient of Dividends that is 
positive (following the correlations and univariate regressions tests) and the 
same applied to this variable when regressing cash holdings but with opposed 
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signs. The Industry median Debt show a different signal than expected in the 
referred section for the cash holdings regression, but followed the pattern 
showed in the correlations and univariate regressions tests. After including the 
unlagged cash holdings in leverage regressions, the coefficients t-statistics wasn’t 
observed great changes (only Cash holdings average’ coefficient dropped to 
about half the value of the t-test losing the status of 1% significant).  
When using the factors chosen for net leverage to create the four models as 
described in methodology (Table 20 (Appendix XX)), the factors Industry median 
Debt, Cash holdings average, Free Cash Flow, Net Working Capital, Stock 
Repurchase, Over investment and Price Volatility are the chosen for this 
approach. The first four are common variables with the leverage factors, and the 
coefficients for those revealed the signals. According to the description in section 
4.6., the Stock Repurchase only after including unlagged cash holdings appeared 
with a positive coefficient, and for cash holdings the same criterions failed as the 
coefficient appeared positive.  The other two factors have the coefficients 
according to the results of the signals analysis. The t-statistics of the variables 
didn’t change considerably.  
The observation of patterns used the two approaches (the eight models and 
regressions) for an understanding of the influence of cash holdings on leverage 
proportion and net leverage. It was observed that when a positive (negative) sign 
in the coefficients of the cash holdings regression was observed to be related with 
an increase (decrease) the coefficient from the leverage regression before and 
after including the unlagged cash holdings (even though the differences 
observed were very small). Moreover, the two regressions where the unlagged 
cash holdings was included had a negative coefficient. The last pattern found 
was observed by connecting the t-statistic value of net leverage with either the 
value in leverage or in cash holdings by the near value. It was observed that when 
the value of the t-statistic in net leverage is closer to the one in leverage, is related 
with a lowering of the value the coefficient (from the leverage related to the net 
leverage related). On the opposite, when the value of the t-statistic in net leverage 
is closer to the one in cash holdings, is related with an increasing of the value the 
coefficient (from the leverage related to the net leverage related). The only value 
that wasn’t according to this observation was in the variable of Over investment. 
(Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, & Hirsch, 2016)(Ravier & Lewin, 2012)(Junior & 
Franca, 2012).  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
The present study aimed to help to enlighten that capital structure is not a 
matter only related with a simple dichotomy of equity and debt. In the literature 
review was shown that the theme is more complex where concepts as internal 
equity, liquidity, new external financing, played an important role that must be 
considered in the managing of the financing decisions. This study aims to enforce 
the importance of liquidity being part of the considerations when thinking about 
capital structure theory. The theories presented shown different reasons that 
guide the decision making on this topic. The tradeoff theory is presented as a 
model of choice of optimal decisions or a search for equilibrium, the market 
timing as a model of choice by opportunities available, the pecking order as a 
model of choice by order sustained by a behavioristic argument as well as agency 
theory and managerial optimism. From all the theories some variables were 
suggested to be relevant to influence the capital structure of a company.  
The empirical part of this study aggregated the same explanatory variables to 
three dependent ones. The Net leverage was introduced in order to understand 
the results provided from the models used to explain leverage and cash holdings 
(the proxy for liquidity) and connect them. From the empirical study, the main 
conclusions to achieve are at first the relation of the coefficient and which ones 
were predicted by which theory. The second are which independent variables 
proposed better define each explained variable, and third which patterns are 
found to relate cash holdings and leverage.  
Attending the first, the signals found to be more consistent for explanation of 
the influences are those that are consistently found in the results of the analysis 
of the signals in section 4.6. and also consistent with the signs observed in the 
coefficients after regressing the most consistent factors. So, the greater conclusion 
is that there is a tendency shown for firms to adjust on targets both for debt and 
liquidity which is consistent with the trade-of theory. Note that a proxy for target 
cash holdings were selected to be part of the leverage model. The size measure’s 
coefficient and Tobin’s q are also consistent with the same theory, where the last 
may be significant on leverage regression. This may be due to the variable varies 
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with the capitalization happening the same with the denominator of the leverage 
measure as the criterions used in this paper didn’t show great importance of this 
variable in the other two studied (which may be argument for future research). 
The agency theory supports the results found on the variables Tobin’s q and 
dividends. The variables of free cash flow and net working capital are supported 
by the pecking order. This result confers the suggestion of a combination of cash 
holdings and pecking order more likely as the there are some patterns found for 
the existence of them both. The suggestion is that the trade-off theory may 
explain the boundaries between the different financing sources used, in this case 
the boundaries for the usage of internal equity, debt and new external equity by 
the order suggested in the pecking order theory. In a simplistic way of traducing 
this is that “the manager decides to use what pecking order suggests until what 
trade-off theory allows”. The cash holdings “best” variables follow mostly the 
predictions of the trade-off model.  
The study passes through an extensive battery of tests in order find the most 
reliable variables. The best variables found to explain leverage are size, growth 
opportunities, dividends, the industry median leverage, the five-year average 
cash holdings, the free cash flow (was expected to be more important in cash 
holdings) and the working capital. For cash holdings the most reliable found 
were tangibility, the industry target variables (industry median and five-year 
average cash holdings), stock issuances, spread rate and volatility. The net 
leverage model is composed by the industry median leverage, the cash holdings 
average, the free cash flow, the net working capital, the stock issuances, the 
overinvestment and price volatility. The model was expected to be composed by 
the variables found important for leverage and cash holdings, and the first four 
described are shared with leverage while, the cash holdings average, the working 
capital and volatility are shared with cash holdings. At the end, the variables that 
were found common in the three models were just the cash holdings average and 
the net working capital. There was a limitation of the study as the number of 
variables is too much low and just the cash holdings average proved to have 
performance relevant for one of the independent variables (it was expected that 
the common variables counted with more of the variables that outperformed).  
When comparing the models to evaluate the influence of cash holdings the 
major evidence concludes with cash holdings being negative debt as suggested 
in Acharya et al. (2007). The conclusion is firstly reached by observing that when 
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integrating the unlagged cash holdings as independent variable in leverage 
regressions (using leverage and net leverage selected factors) the coefficient 
observed is always negative. Then the signals of the regression of unlagged cash 
holdings as independent variable always dictate if the dependent variables 
influence (coefficient) rises or drops in leverage regressions after retrieving the 
cash holdings effects (inserting the unlagged cash holdings). But the most 
interesting pattern found (except for one variable) is by observing the t-statistics 
and comparing the evolution of the coefficient from leverage to net leverage. 
When the net leverage t-statistic values are closer to the ones of leverage 
regressions, the coefficient of the independent variables drop from the regression 
of leverage to net leverage. On the opposite when the net leverage t-statistic 
values are closer to the ones of cash holdings regressions, the coefficient of the 
independent variables tend to increase from the regression of leverage to net 
leverage. This is another proof that cash holdings and leverage are negative 
related, as it seems that leverage and cash holdings tend to offset each other’s 
influence on net leverage.  
The conclusions of all the work provided evidence that is suggested in the 
literature concerning cash holdings provided evidence supportive of tradeoff as 
concluded in Opler et al. (1999) and Ferreira & Vilela (2004). The referenced paper 
of Acharya et al. (2007) suggested the same conclusions retrieved for the negative 
relation between liquidity and debt. The paper that provided the idea for the 
methodology (Frank & Goyal, 2009) suggested results that were also found, 
namely for the variables of median industry leverage, size, market to book assets 
ratio (Tobin’s Q) and dividends. Surprisingly profits and tangibility and expected 
inflation were not included in the best model for leverage in this study. The 
profits may be explained by the introduction of free cash flow,  that captures the 
same predictions but may be  more reliable as suggested in Fernandez (2017).  
Some variables were not found to have the impact that were expected, mostly 
the hedging needs, spread rates, expected inflation, and even overinvestment. 
This may be result from approaches that may be done with different measures 
that may be more reliable that the used. Other limitations are found in this study 
to achieve the expected conclusions. First one is the difficulty in find data to 
proxy credit lines, as it was found in the literature to be important for measuring 
liquidity and the same for ownership structure. Another important limitation is 
the computing cash holdings wit net assets as denominator. The variability of 
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values in the sample that may have biased some results inducing in error some 
results. Therefore, the industry median cash holdings, the cash holdings average 
and the industry sigma were directly related with that limitation which could 
provide other results concerning the same variables.  
Then for future studies, the inclusion of ownership structure variables and 
unused borrowing power may help to get more detailed information concerning 
the study of this matter. Better proxies for some variables may be also 
approached in order to infer more consistent results that were expected 
concerning the ones related in the last paragraph. The using of a measure of cash 
holdings as the ratio of cash and equivalents on the book value of assets is 
expected to provide different results that may be interesting. 
Even with all the limitation, surprisingly, many conclusions collided with the 
expectations, which may induce that the proxy used for liquidity may be taking 
into account for future studies. This result found in this study, directed towards 
the conclusion that liquidity is an important part of the capital structure as well 
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Independent Variable Coef t-stat sign R2 Coef t-stat sign R2 Coef t-stat sign R2
Cash Hold (t-1) -0.0932 -5.50 0.000 0.0589 n.o n.o n.o n.o -0.2935 -7.28 0.000 0.3099
Size 0.0388 7.75 0.000 0.1329 -0.0638 -5.26 0.000 0.0609 0.0412 7.29 0.000 0.0795
Tobin's Q -0.0605 -12.42 0.000 0.2419 0.1094 8.46 0.000 0.1343 -0.0649 -8.67 0.000 0.1474
Dividends -1.2088 -6.99 0.000 0.0366 -1.2265 -2.09 0.037 0.0064 0.1992 0.56 0.572 0.0005
Profit -0.7756 -8.57 0.000 0.1401 -0.6148 -1.55 0.120 0.0150 -0.2601 -1.90 0.057 0.0084
Tangibility 0.2790 8.15 0.000 0.0763 -0.6326 -7.24 0.000 0.0666 0.4336 9.05 0.000 0.0978
Inflation 0.0004 0.10 0.922 0.0000 0.0043 0.63 0.526 0.0002 0.0005 0.08 0.935 0.0000
Ind. Debt 0.8315 18.82 0.000 0.3893 -0.8236 -7.07 0.000 0.0649 0.8499 12.98 0.000 0.2157
Ind. Cash -0.2945 -7.96 0.000 0.0828 1.3461 7.82 0.000 0.2937 -0.6713 -10.10 0.000 0.2280
Cash avg. -0.0575 -4.88 0.000 0.0428 0.4887 15.05 0.000 0.5248 -0.1652 -5.73 0.000 0.1871
FCF -0.9634 -10.37 0.000 0.1711 0.0220 0.05 0.958 0.0000 -0.7791 -5.24 0.000 0.0593
Ind. Sigma -2.4654 -8.85 0.000 0.1064 9.3864 6.95 0.000 0.2620 -4.6603 -9.94 0.000 0.2017
WC -0.2416 -4.88 0.000 0.0293 -0.5503 -3.60 0.000 0.0258 -0.0739 -1.03 0.301 0.0015
R&D hedge (cf) -0.0527 -1.85 0.065 0.0060 0.0412 0.80 0.423 0.0006 -0.0551 -1.55 0.122 0.0035
R&D hedge (fcf) 0.0167 0.93 0.353 0.0014 -0.0811 -2.07 0.039 0.0055 0.0392 1.48 0.139 0.0040
Sal. Hedge (cf) 0.0367 1.38 0.166 0.0028 -0.0583 -1.00 0.317 0.0012 0.0554 1.48 0.140 0.0033
Sal. Hedge (fcf) -0.0056 -0.25 0.806 0.0001 -0.0666 -1.21 0.226 0.0027 0.0294 1.00 0.318 0.0017
Issue -0.7659 -7.59 0.000 0.0212 4.3670 7.65 0.000 0.1171 -1.7150 -9.74 0.000 0.0564
Repurchase -0.6903 -8.33 0.000 0.0500 1.0071 2.91 0.004 0.0181 -0.5298 -3.46 0.001 0.0156
Spread -0.0199 -2.63 0.009 0.0150 0.0350 3.47 0.001 0.0079 -0.0143 -2.59 0.010 0.0041
EPS Sur. 0.0001 1.00 0.320 0.0003 0.0003 1.04 0.300 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.41 0.679 0.0000
Overinv. 0.0714 3.47 0.001 0.0172 0.1326 2.95 0.003 0.0100 -0.0799 -2.70 0.007 0.0114
Volatility -0.0016 -2.11 0.035 0.0075 0.0167 6.45 0.000 0.1363 -0.0096 -9.60 0.000 0.1409
Cash Hold Leverage Net Leverage
Table 6: Independent or Univariate Regressions 
The table reports the values provided from simple independent or univariate OLS 
Regressions. The variables computation is described in table 2. The data treatment is described in 
the chapter "Data and Methodology". For each factor is reported the coefficient (Coef), the t-
statistics (t-stat), the p-value (sign) and the r-squared (R2). 
  
 














